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Saved from Salvation: Friedrich Nietzsche in the Work of René Girard 
by James MacCormac 
  
Abstract: Literary critic René Girard pays special attention to the work of Friedrich 
Nietzsche in his writing. His assessment is generally negative, and those writers 
who have participated in Girard‘s project tend to share that view. A positive 
assessment of Nietzsche in light of Girard‘s work has been neglected. In this 
thesis I survey and analyze themes about desire and selfhood in both authors‘ 
work, showing the value of a Girardian view of Nietzsche and a Nietzschean view 
of Girard, and then move to a proposal for an alternate, positive view of 
Nietzsche in Girardian theory.  

















Introduction: The Scandal of Nietzsche 
 The most remarkable feature of our world is its loudly advertised repugnance for 
victimage, which has no equivalent in any other society. Even if our deeds do not match 
our principles, even if our record of persecution sharply contradicts our language, our 
awareness of scapegoating is unique, and it cannot be traced exclusively to what 
Nietzsche calls "resentment" or "slave morality," however pertinent the Nietzschean 
critique of our world occasionally is. 
 Like all good things, our concern for victims can be horribly abused, but the very 
abuse still indirectly testifies to the excellence of the thing abused, which is really a 
priceless gift to us from the Jewish and Christian scripture. Nietzsche was too obsessed 
with the caricature of this gift to acknowledge the existence of the original. 
 - René Girard1 
 
  In these brief paragraphs we catch glimpses of three key themes from literary 
critic René Girard's work, which I will expand on. First: Modern civilization is unique, and 
its uniqueness, both for good and for ill, is rooted in its awareness and defense of victims 
– which is in turn a ―priceless gift‖ from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Second: This 
awareness of victims has not always resulted in concrete actions, as the awareness is 
often distorted. The still existing issues of racism, sexism, and political persecution, 
among many others, attest to this. Girard alludes to this with characteristic 
understatement when he says ―our deeds do not match our principles.‖ Third: Nietzsche 
was the closest to undoing the distortion of this awareness and so closest to Girard's 
own view of this awareness, but Nietzsche failed. 
                                                          
1
 René Girard, foreword to The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred by James G. Williams (London: 
Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007), ix. 
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 All of these themes will be touched on, but it is the third theme, Girard's 
assessment of Nietzsche, which will be the focus. That Nietzsche does come very close 
to Girard's view in many respects is not disputed. Nor are Girard's concerns about 
Nietzsche's often uncritical adoption by the academy totally rejected. What is missing 
from contemporary scholarship is an examination of Girard‘s tendency to be inconsistent 
and careless in his treatment of Nietzsche, who can be seen both as a proto-Girardian 
ally and a friend to Girard‘s mimetic theory. I argue that Nietzsche‘s work, his ―gay 
science,‖ -- though it does have strongly violent and pessimistic tendencies -- is a worthy 
and valuable ally, as well as precursor, to Girard‘s mimetic theory. At times it strives 
towards a love not unlike the Girardian ideal, as well as providing an affirmative account 
of desire, in contrast to Girard‘s generally negative assessment. 
  In order to make this argument, this thesis will survey and analyze themes about 
desire and selfhood in both authors‘ work, showing the value of a Girardian view of 
Nietzsche and a Nietzschean view of Girard, and then move to a proposal for an 
alternate view of Nietzsche in Girardian theory. Though the emphasis will be on primary 
sources, attention will be paid to commentary from scholarship on both figures. 
   The parallels between Nietzsche‘s and Girard‘s work are many. Both see 
Christianity as unique in its defense of victims; both see a social, dynamic whirlwind of 
desires and forces as shaping individual selves, and thus human relations and history; 
both see religions as created and sustained out of this whirlwind, structures which give 
direction to desire; and both see the major issues of the modern world as somehow 
caused by Christianity. What their accounts also share is an aversion to traditional 
notions of redemption and salvation, understood as bringing freedom from desire. While 
Nietzsche sees both terms as fundamentally embedded in the wish of both Christianity 
and Platonism for another world, Girard emphasizes that Christian redemption can have 
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social, this-worldly meanings that do not subdue life in this world, but help it flourish. 
Their shared quest is for an answer to the crisis of modernity, which is, in Girardian 
terms, a mimetic crisis without end, and in Nietzschean terms, the condition of nihilism. 
Neither believes that a simple exit from the world will suffice, as both see the self as 
formed out of the forces and desires in its environmental and social context. Instead 
there must be a new approach to suffering and to desire, one which does not seek (a 
false) transcendence. It is in articulating a positive, affirmative approach to mimetic 
desire that Nietzsche offers something valuable, which Girard rejects by reading 
Nietzsche in a shallow way. By deepening Girard‘s reading, I will show how Nietzschean 
thought can contribute to Girard‘s theory of mimetic desire. And to begin deepening this 
reading, first I will outline briefly the role Nietzsche plays for Girard. 
 From various comments throughout Girard‘s work,2 it can be seen that he puts 
Nietzsche in the role of, to borrow a phrase from Kathleen Skerrett, his ―indispensible 
rival.‖3 Nietzsche is brilliant, yet dangerous, and is used by Girard as shorthand for many 
important contemporaries of Girard (e.g. Derrida) as well as influential figures (e.g. 
Heidegger) who are, collectively, the purveyors of an intellectual nihilism in Girard‘s view.  
He is also the figure who comes closest to Girard‘s own insights, as Girard sees, and so 
is the rival who can challenge and strengthen Girard‘s thinking, if engaged with. 
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 Comments which will be examined in the coming pages. 
3
 Kathleen Skerrett, ―The Indispensible Rival: William Connolly‘s Engagement with Augustine of 
Hippo,‖ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 72:2 (2004), 487-506.  
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Nietzsche‘s own attitude towards rivals is worth considering for Girard: ―Learning from 
one‘s enemies is the best way toward loving them; for it makes us grateful to them.‖45 
  Yet Nietzsche‘s place in Girard‘s work is not only the indispensible rival but also 
the just victim. In his insightful essay on Girard and Nietzsche, Tobin Siebers points out 
Girard‘s hypocrisy in his treatment of Nietzsche -- Nietzsche is Girard‘s chosen victim, a 
scapegoat, whose guilt is very real and whose punishment is just. There can be no 
exoneration6 for him or his spiritual ―sons‖ and ―daughters‖ (the ―French Heideggarians‖).7 
Of course Girard does not go so far as to fully ―scapegoat‖ Nietzsche, who, existing only 
in name, can only be expelled repeatedly in name. Nevertheless Nietzsche does serve 
as a focal point for the trends which Girard is most concerned about, and functions as a 
figure that should be expelled yet venerated -- a figure of power whose figurative 
expulsion from the intellectual community would provide some measure of salvation for 
that world. 
  An example of this comes when Girard discusses Nietzsche‘s last years (after 
1889), which he spent insane and unable to work, under the care of his sister. ―In his 
later years, Nietzsche kept reviving, glorifying and modernizing more and more sinister 
aspects of the primitive sacred. I am convinced that this process became more 
intolerable as it became more radical and it led to his final breakdown.‖8 Girard uses 
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Nietzsche, ―Mixed Opinions and Maxims,‖ The Portable Nietzsche, 248. 
6
 Tobin Siebers, The Ethics of Criticism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988),153. 
7
 Girard, ―Dionysus versus the Crucified,‖ 818.  
8
 Ibid, 827.  
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neutral language, simply referring to a ―process,‖ but, taken along with other comments, 
it appears Girard deems Nietzsche‘s fate a just consequence of his thought.9 Nietzsche‘s 
definite crime for Girard was rejecting Christianity even as he saw its full uniqueness, 
which for Girard, is its defense of victims, synonymous with its weakening of the primitive 
sacred.  
 When reading Nietzsche, it is clear that he splits an imagined ―authentic 
Christianity‖ from what Christianity had become in history (starting with Saint Paul), 
running counter to Girard‘s claims that Nietzsche sees Christianity‘s message as he 
does, the Girardian ―true‖ version.10 Nietzsche rejects the Christian god of his time, 
proclaims that god‘s death, and the accompanying certainty associated with such a god, 
but retains the possibility of a certain kind of Christian faith,11 sensing that there is 
something more to it than he can articulate. Girard himself puts forward a view in line 
with this, but without an explicit reference to Nietzsche:  
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 Another example can be found in Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 310: 
―[I]n his work on Greek religion, despite all his intuitions, Nietzsche never uncovered the 
significance of the Dionysiac mania. But even a relatively ignorant ancient Greek on reading this 
book, would have been able to predict that the author would go mad. You cannot espouse 
Dionysus, in the way that Nietzsche does, outside any form of ritual, without exposing yourself to 
unrestrained release of the mania." 
10
 An example: ―Nietzsche saw clearly that Jesus died not as a sacrificial victim of the Dionysian 
type, but against all such sacrifices. Nietzsche accused this death of being a hidden act of 
ressentiment because it reveals the injustice of all such deaths and the ‗absurdity‘ not of one 
specific mob only but of all ‗dionysian‘ mobs the world over.‖ Girard, ―Dionysus versus the 
Crucified,‖ 822. 
11
 See Nietzsche, ―The Antichrist,‖ 39. ―To this day such a life is still possible, and for certain men 
even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity will remain possible in all ages.‖  
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The ‗death of God‘ is nothing, in my view, but a misinterpretation of the 
tremendous desacralizing process brought about by the Christian revelation. The 
gods who are dying are the sacrificial gods, really, not the Christian God, who 
has nothing to do with them. The confusion between the two, however, is likely to 
continue and to become even more complete than at the present time before the 
true singularity of the Christian God can be acknowledged.12  
  Here we find evidence that, from a Girardian view, Nietzsche, while certainly not 
blameless, is not guilty of the charge of rejecting the Christian message so much as 
rejecting a Christianity whose God is a supreme sacrificial god. This father God holds 
onto all the habits of the old father-kings of the primitive sacred, but includes a command 
to ―love the weak,‖ and defers all possible joy to another world. To Nietzsche there is no 
hope for a world that serves such a god -- and no reason to love such a world. As a 
result, Nietzsche puts all his strength towards saving those who will listen from the 
―salvation‖ of the sacrificial god.  
  Along with Girard‘s limited reading of Nietzsche‘s Christianity lies the missed 
opportunity to view Nietzsche as a challenge to a ―bad‖ mimetic desire. Girard‘s theory of 
mimetic desire, based as it is on imitation as the central feature of human desire, should 
examine Nietzsche‘s struggles with role models (e.g. Wagner). Yet when Girard does so, 
Girard is again less than charitable in his assessment of Nietzsche on this score, looking 
at him only as an extreme romantic figure:  
[T]he real credit for the tabula rasa school of innovation should go to Nietzsche, 
who was tired of repeating with everybody else that a great thinker should have 
no model. He went one better, as always and refused to be a model -- the mark of 
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 Rebecca Adams and René Girard, ―Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with René 
Girard‖ Religion & Literature 25: 2 (1993): 33. 
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genius. This is still a sensation that is being piously repeated today. Nietzsche is 
our supreme model of model-repudiation, our revered guru of guru-renunciation.13  
Here Girard touches on something important -- Nietzsche‘s call to imitate him, follow him, 
but not declare him master. This is best captured when Zarathustra addresses his 
disciples, and when he declares that his way is only one which is available among 
many.14 Taken alone, and with Nietzsche‘s struggles with his own influences, it does 
seem fair to state that Nietzsche offers a stale restatement of ―be yourself‖ in the 
Romantic mold. To simply leave it at that is to do Nietzsche a disservice and to miss the 
great work that Nietzsche does in attempting to grow with his influences and context. In 
the text quoted above, Girard speaks of Nietzsche in the context of the great shift from 
imitating the masters of the past to becoming the master of one‘s own creation from a 
tabula rasa. Yet Nietzsche does not believe a totally new world is possible -- he knows 
that to deal with one‘s self now is to produce a genealogy, a story, which will link one to 
those who have passed. He opposes and fights against Socrates, Saint Paul, 
Schopenhauer, and many other men of the past in a way which does imitate them, but 
does not seek to reproduce them. Nietzsche ―becomes who he is‖ through becoming, 
however briefly and imperfectly, those he admires and opposes. In affirming his will to 
power, Nietzsche proposes that we weave the many threads of our becoming into 
something new, instead of straining to find a final, supreme goal in one way of life, the 
way of some master. 
  In the next four chapters, I will show how Nietzsche and Girard can be read 
together productively, taking into consideration these disagreements, beginning with their 
accounts of religion and desire in chapter one. Continuing with this theme I will return to 
                                                          
13 René Girard, ―Innovation and Repetition.‖ SubStance, 19:62/63 (1990): 12-13. 
14
 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ―On the Spirit of Gravity.‖ 
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the ―death of God‖ in chapter two. In chapter three I will propose a positive Girardian 
reading Nietzsche. And in chapter four I will bring this version of Nietzsche into dialogue 
with some of Girard‘s interpreters to show how such a Nietzsche can find a place in a 
























Killed to Keep the World Turning:15 The Birth of the Gods 
 
 The site where Girardian and Nietzschean thought cross most clearly and 
frequently is that of religion. In this chapter, the intertwined accounts of self, desire, and 
God from both accounts are examined. Nietzsche names the relation of self and desire 
as ―will to power,‖ while Girard dubs it ―mimetic desire.‖ Girard‘s theory suffers from a 
continually negative account of desire, and therefore of selfhood, something which limits 
the application of his thought. I argue that Nietzsche‘s ideas about religion‘s origins and 
function can serve as useful, constructive additions to Girard‘s mimetic theory, which 
Girard overlooks and dismisses in his weak reading of Nietzsche. 
  For both thinkers, the ―self‖ or center of a human being is constituted by what he 
or she desires, whether consciously or unconsciously. In pre-modern cultures, as well as 
within many cultures today, what is to be desired is determined by inherited tradition. 
Tradition is often what could be called ―religious,‖ but it can take many forms. It offers 
role models and rules which guide desire, and so leads to the development of certain 
models of self. Every group has its ―god,‖ its center figure or figures, and the majority of 
European culture had believed its God was the god, the center of centers. But this was 
doubted more and more in 19th century Europe, Nietzsche‘s era. The philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, both in its empiricist and rationalist forms, lead to new ways of thinking 
about the Christian God, some of which lead to either a loss of faith in him or indifference 
to him. The god who had allowed for and encouraged the pursuit of truth had been 
undermined in many quarters by that very ideal, leaving many adrift and confused.  In 
the wake of this crisis, people sought new ways to create roles and ways of life for 
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themselves. Some responded by trying to direct their desire intentionally (the utilitarian, 
―rational‖ response), while others believed that spontaneous, intuitive desires from deep 
within one‘s self should be followed to obtain happiness (the ―romantic‖ response). Both 
responses had some success, and popularity, yet neither was able to center these 
cultures again, leading to an increasingly fragmentary world. Nietzsche and Girard both 
respond to this situation, attempting to understand it through their analysis of religion, 
especially the Christian religion. Girard‘s analysis is insightful, and, as I show here, is 
prefigured in many places by Nietzsche‘s.   
 René Girard‘s work centers on the insight that human beings do not desire 
without first seeing what others (appear to) desire. Girard refers to this as ―mimetic 
desire,‖ as humans mimic or imitate what others do. That is, we humans do not seek 
particular objects without first being conditioned to do so. We do have biological needs 
which are present even before we recognize others, but these are shaped into desires by 
the intervention of another. For a human to grow and change in a group, she must have 
role models who embody ways of acting in the world, which are also ways of desiring in 
the world. When learning and imitating, the role model seems to have a secret power, in 
that she knows what is proper to desire, and can show us how to obtain it. A parent is 
the easiest example to think about in this role, but school teachers, friends, enemies, and 
lovers all end up inhabiting the same role at some point in human lives. As a person 
comes to know these important figures, and approach their level of skill, the illusion of a 
―secret power‖ slowly fades. The role models are seen as quite similar, as a person now 
knows how to desire as they do, as well as how to compete and cooperate with them.16  
  With this in mind, we see the importance of tradition, as mentioned above, and 
the way that it is structured around role models. The social orders which form in a society 
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tell each person what they can hope for, what they can desire, and also which desires 
are most important. Innovations come through renewal or reinterpretation of past 
desires. Religion, as the category of institutions which speaks of the most important 
desires and duties, serves as the order of orders, or, as mentioned above, the center of 
centers. The gods serve as transcendent role models, who hold the secret power which 
can never quite be obtained, as they can never be fully imitated.17  
  When many persons seek the same things, the divisions between them begin to 
break down as they imitate each other more exactly in an effort to outdo one another. 
Every action becomes more and more calculated to cause the other to stumble. Taking 
the limited example of two individuals, we can imagine how the competition eventually 
overtakes the actual objects desired, spilling over into hatred and confusion. My friend 
and I both wish to have a piece of cake which is unavailable anywhere else. It cannot be 
shared, cannot be bought. This seems exaggerated, and it is, yet this is the nature of 
such a struggle. It is not so much that I want the piece of cake but that I want to have the 
piece of cake rather than my rival. The momentum of competition causes one‘s 
conscious identity to shift more and more towards contrast with the other person. Yet 
that other person consistently makes decisions that mirror my own -- she reaches for the 
cake, watches the cake, strikes at the hand of her adversary who seeks the cake.  To my 
horror, as well as my friend‘s, we realize how similar we are, that we are fueled by the 
same desire. The difference between myself and the other, so important in our 
competition, our community, and our lives, is threatened. Here the rules of our tradition 
may intervene to divert the competition from disaster. For example, it may be that I must 
defer to my friend due to her familial status, or that my career gives me some sort of 
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intrinsic right to the item. But in the end the competition must be settled and somehow be 
seen as fair and orderly. 
  In the event of a natural disaster, such as a plague or fire, the rules of tradition 
can be pushed to the breaking point. The intense desires for safety (a certain species of 
the ―secret power‖) cause fierce competition for any and all objects that can provide it, 
and the rules which regulate competition are strained and set aside. It is here that Girard 
sees the roots of religion, which I will examine in more detail shortly. To be brief, as the 
intensity grows, the community becomes more and more violent, with all differentiation 
breaking down -- a mimetic crisis. Differences that are still noticeable, even if they were 
insignificant prior to the crisis, suddenly are seized upon. As a result, any minor 
difference can put a person at risk.  
  For Girard, all pre-modern traditions have built into them a method for dealing 
with the mimetic crisis, and that is choosing a scapegoat. It is not important if the person 
chosen is guilty, or in some cases, if it is a person at all, as animals too can be chosen. 
What is important is that proper ritual (whether sacrifice on an altar or standing before a 
judge) is followed so that the expulsion (banishment, killing, dismemberment) of the 
figure is considered legitimate. When the figure is dealt with, as the ―cause‖ of the 
problem, the feeling of victory and security is regained by the authorities and so by the 
community. 
  This brief sketch outlines the basic concepts of Girardian thought. The next step 
is to look more closely at religion, and its mimetic structure according to both Nietzsche 
and Girard. To begin, picture this scene: A solitary, fierce looking statue stands at the 
entrance of a small town. It carries a sword in its hand and it looks out into the 
countryside with a calm, firm gaze. The monument represents the god of the people who 
live in the town, as well as many other nearby towns. Stories are told about the god‘s 
14 
exploits, which include: defending the people, giving them laws, and establishing a line of 
kings. Most important among these stories is one about the god‘s death and 
resurrection. It is well known that through the great sacrifice of the god‘s own life, he 
brought the people order, and was resurrected soon after. 
  In Nietzsche‘s view,18 this god is the guiding principle of the people, and he gives 
them strength, both by being an example in his deeds and by providing laws. If the god 
inspires and provides the people with the means to live, to expand, to grow in power, and 
to enjoy living, then the god is healthy. But if the god inspires behaviour that stunts the 
growth and joy of the group, it is a sick god, one which ought to be put down. The god 
represents the will of the people, which Nietzsche describes as ―everything aggressive 
and power-thirsty in a people [...].‖19 Nietzsche‘s ideal for a healthy god, the Greek 
Dionysus, is a god who dies and is subsequently resurrected. Nietzsche sees this as a 
promise that life ―will be eternally reborn and return again from destruction.‖20 The 
promise inspires the people who follow Dionysus to pursue their collective will to power, 
as it states that life survives and flourishes despite destruction.  
  The ―will to power‖ is Nietzsche‘s central philosophical principle, and it states that 
behind every action and interpretation an entity makes is a desire to expand its power. 
This ―will‖ appears to be singular but is always a tangle of multiple wills, rooted in the 
actions and reactions of everything happening in a time and place. Therefore the origin 
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of all forms of thought is a group or person‘s desires and life situation, and the most 
sophisticated and potent sort of situation for the divine is agon or competitions with 
others. A religion, and its god or gods, are a primal form of the will to power, and exist to 
promote the growth and success of a group. Gods can become ―sick‖ when they no 
longer promote such growth, but yet remain in place, with the people still following them, 
leading to the degeneration of the people. As Nietzsche states in The Antichrist, ―there is 
no other alternative for gods: either they are the will to power, and they remain a 
people‘s gods, or the incapacity for power.‖21 What the god‘s laws produce are ―good‖ 
insofar as they promote the life and power of the people, while what is ―evil‖ threatens 
them. One can see here that ultimately for Nietzsche the will to power is ―beyond good 
and evil,‖ as it is the foundation of such evaluations. The god does not exist, except 
insofar as it promotes the people‘s will to power. 
  For Girard, in contrast, this god is not all it appears to be, and has a violent 
genesis.22 His explanation takes the form of a narrative, though one that needs a brief 
preface. In Girard‘s early studies of the novels of Proust, Dostoevsky, and others, along 
with the plays of Shakespeare,23 he found that the motivations of people and 
organizations are built upon mimetic desire. Girard contends that the texts considered to 
be the best of modern Western literature described a process where persons find their 
desires by observing what others want. The refinement of tastes, competition for 
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resources, courtship, war -- all of these were imitative in their origin. The imitative urge 
was found to have a ―metaphysical‖ quality, as people sought to be like others they 
thought had a more stable ―being.‖24 This imitation often leads to competition for objects 
and resources, and then to violent conflicts. The most realistic and moving narratives 
capture this, as well as capturing the curious fact that men and women seldom know that 
they are imitating others, thinking instead that their desire is original. This adds an extra 
layer of confusion to any conflict that occurs -- and when this gets out of hand, an entire 
community can find itself at odds, for reasons no one within can really understand.  
 This mimetic crisis underlies the violent genesis of each god. Long ago, two 
events occurred together: there was a great calamity in a community, and a real person 
(as opposed to a divine one) was killed by the community. The exact reason for the 
killing is shrouded in mystery for the people who honour the god, though there are 
always claims that the god was guilty of a crime. In Violence and the Sacred, Girard 
looks at the sacred myths of a variety of cultures (though he centers his attention on 
Greek tragedy) and finds the presence of this pattern, known to past anthropologists, but 
not, in his view, sufficiently commented upon: the sacrifice of a human victim who is 
considered to be guilty of extreme crimes. Incest, rape, genocide, patricide – these are 
examples of the crimes attributed to the victims in the myths he examines. The victim is 
found to also be someone ―marked,‖ often by nationality or deformity. For example in 
Euripides‘ Bacchae, the god Dionysus is portrayed as coming to Greece from far off 
Asia.25 The myths are present in sophisticated, intelligent cultures, yet the suspicion that 
foreignness or deformity might be the cause of the victim‘s selection, rather than the 
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grandiose charges, does not seem to factor into the accounts. Why, Girard wonders, is it 
now obvious to us in the modern world that these factors might be important and the 
charges false, yet it was not obvious to these past men and women? There is no answer 
at this point Girard‘s research. Yet he finds something still stranger -- the same attributes 
of being criminal and being ―marked‖ are also present for kings in these same cultures. 
Further, both the kings and the mythical victims are often referred to as being gods. But 
what sort of god dies at the hands of his own people? What sort of king is obliged to 
marry his sister? Girard comes to the conclusion that all gods, and all kings, roughly 
follow this pattern. To become gods, first the god must die.26 Similarly, to become king, 
one must be outside the usual order, ―marked‖ as both an outsider and divine. 
 This basic insight, of a unity between victimhood and godhood, outsider and 
royalty, leads into the second part of Girard‘s religious anthropology, which is the 
function of such myths and their accompanying festivals. Girard theorizes that the victims 
of ritual violence are needed to bind the community together, and that the most important 
festivals in a culture recreate this binding effect. Theoretically, there is a scenario which 
brings great turmoil to a group -- a flood, a poor harvest, a drought, a shortage of game, 
etc. Anything that affects the majority‘s lives will do, as long as the community is totally 
disordered. In the Bacchae, Girard notes that Dionysus, coming from Asia, brings with 
him a plague, and murders a king, Pentheus, both highly significant events for a 
community. The victim may not have anything to do with the problem that occurs -- that 
is attributed later, in Girard‘s theory. What is important is that the foreign figure is present 
when the disorder occurs, and, as someone marginal to the previous order, is 
considered an agent of disorder. The community, in a state of high emotions and conflict 
due to this disorder becomes a mob, attributes all the ―evil‖ to the foreigner, and ends up 
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killing him or her. When the outsider is killed, the mob collectively senses its unity, and 
sees that the crisis has been resolved. In the calm that follows the killing, this group can 
put their life into order, assigning roles and reasserting social order. The momentous 
event marks a new beginning and new life for the group. After the event, this figure and 
his paradoxical characteristics are elevated to the status of a god. As Girard puts it: 
"Once it is understood that the inversion of the real relation between victim and 
community occurs in the resolution of the crisis, it is possible to see why the victim is 
believed to be sacred. The victim is held responsible for the renewed calm in the 
community and for the disorder that preceded this return. It is even believed to have 
brought about its own death."27 The great power attributed to the victim both explains the 
initial event and hides the innocence of the victim.  
  Festivals begin slowly, as the community remembers the stories of their 
ancestors and re-enacts them to preserve order. The original event fades from memory 
but the central sacrifice of the god and his powers remain, as does the festival‘s 
disordered quality. A festival is a community‘s way of recreating the unity that comes 
from escaping disorder, while avoiding the recognition of the victim(s) they 
commemorate.  
  Nietzsche‘s and Girard‘s accounts both give an idea of the genesis of religions, 
and both emphasize the function a religion performs. Certain contrasting tendencies 
between Nietzsche and Girard‘s work are brought out. Nietzsche has a tendency to treat 
―truth‖ as a matter of victory, that is, what enhances the ―will to power‖ of a group or 
person. A religion helps a group gain victory by interpreting situations and conditions in a 
way favorable to that group. While this is true for Girard as well, he adds a tendency to 
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resist attempts to relativize truth in such a way by emphasizing the fact that there are 
victims, those who are sacrificed and consumed by a group or person, and moreover 
that these victims matter just as much as those who are victors. A second, related 
contrast is the view of a god‘s ―health.‖ Nietzsche sees a god as healthy as long as its 
people are healthy and still pursuing their own growth, their will to power. Girard sees 
gods as unhealthy insofar as they neglect or cover over the truth of victims, regardless of 
the ―health‖ of the group. Both Nietzsche and Girard show us how the basis of religions28 
can be conceived of as a sort of fiction, which provides role models and aims and so an 
order for a group. Religious order and ritual for both thinkers exists to fend off the 
mimetic crisis so that the group can live and expand, constructing notions of selfhood 
based in this order.  
  The inspiration for Girard‘s and Nietzsche‘s examination of ancient religions, 
especially those of ancient Greece, is the situation of modern Europe. By examining the 
genealogy of Christianity29 which appears for both thinkers as an exception to their 
accounts of religion, they hope to find a way to better understand the ever growing 
mimetic crisis of the modern world (disastrous conflicts of all sorts). The exceptional 
quality of Judaism and Christianity is the key source of Girard‘s rivalry with Nietzsche. 
For Nietzsche, as will be explained below, the Jewish and Christian scriptures represent 
two religious anomalies which are brilliant but dangerous to the world -- a ―slave morality‖ 
constructed by enslaved and suffering people to justify their own state. Such a strategy 
seems to Nietzsche to make sense in the short term. But that such a religion would 
continue, overtaking and absorbing other ―healthier‖ religious views (gods of war and 
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expansion) is a mystery to him. For Girard too, the Jewish and Christian scriptures are 
an anomaly when compared to other religions, but a positive one if properly understood. 
To do this one must make reference to the ecology of religions in which they originated, 
seeing these scriptures as a sort of commentary on their time and place.   
  After Violence and the Sacred, Girard brings his new programme of searching for 
scapegoats to bear on texts outside the anthropological literature and Greek tragedies 
he had been examining in his previous work and so turns to an examination of the 
Jewish and Christian scriptures. The results of his extensive studies, conducted with his 
co-authors Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, are revealed in his magnum opus, 
Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World.  In the Gospels, Girard finds the same 
structure as that of Dionysus and other sacrificial gods, but it plays out in a slightly 
different key. The god-man Jesus also dies through collective violence, thought to be for 
the good of the people.30 Yet, in contrast to the tales about Dionysus, his divine status is 
not recognized by those who kill him, but instead by those who stand by him and 
recognize him as innocent. The figure of Christ, presented as God, King, and Saviour, 
takes on these roles in a way that, unlike that of earlier figures, is notably non-violent, 
with love rather than violent power as the central tenet. In doing so Girard claims Jesus 
undermines the power of other gods and their cults, which Girard refers to as ―the 
sacred,‖ ―primitive sacred,‖ or ―primitive religions,‖ and which he claims are built upon 
unacknowledged victims. Moreover, Christ‘s words indicate that in his actions he is 
imitating his ―Father,‖ the god of the oppressed Jewish people. Girard interprets Jesus as 
the scapegoat who reveals scapegoats, and reads the Gospel as a text which 
undermines communities based on persecution. Girard‘s rediscovery and redescription 
of the Gospel message emerges from his studies in literature and mythology. 
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The Religions of the Sick 
 
  In contrast to Girard‘s renewed Christianity, the most important goal for Nietzsche 
is to find an alternative to Christianity, which, as a ―sick‖ religion, is causing Europe to 
give up on life, with terminal symptoms Nietzsche names ―decadence‖ and ―nihilism.‖31 
His vitriol against Christianity is clear and strong: ―What is more harmful than any vice? 
Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity.‖32 Nietzsche sees Christianity 
as inventing a sort of guilt which paralyzes and enforces a ―passive nihilism,‖ a guilt that 
weighs down everyone so that it becomes evident to them there is no way to progress or 
change in life. Only in another life, far away, beyond the earth (and after death), can 
there be happiness again -- in other words, in heaven. In the meantime, life is largely a 
state of suffering and strife, to be endured but never embraced. The mimetic structure of 
desire, when mixed with such a Christianity, causes all to be drawn down into this slow 
death. 
   For Nietzsche, Judaism and Christianity are the brilliant inventions of physically 
and psychically weak people being dominated by other, stronger cultures.33 Nietzsche 
seizes on the Jewish theme of being exiles and slaves and asserts that this condition, 
combined with a certain genius, drives Jewish religion. Its counter-narrative claims that 
those who ruled did not deserve to, that there is a different, hidden standard of victory. 
Once this impulse was popularized and exaggerated to the point where all people, rather 
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than just the Jewish people, belong to the God of the oppressed, then the whole of 
Greco-Roman culture becomes one which advocates weakness and consequently the 
expulsion (or at least disapproval) of strong passion. For Nietzsche, this is a general 
description of Christendom. Extending from an embrace of passivity, he sees in the 
Christianity of his time an unwillingness to embrace life, the end state of a long sickness. 
Yet he does not see Christianity as a salve for suffering as do many others who 
contextualize Christianity in history. Instead he sees Christianity as the greatest example 
of how a human group might use suffering to gain power. The popular Christianity that 
Nietzsche sees sets each person to be reactive rather than active and dynamic in 
relation to the world. As Tobin Siebers puts it, this ―reactive‖ impulse acts against others, 
rather than acting (and creating) for one‘s self.34  
 ―Slave morality‖ and ―resentment‖ are two key ideas which Nietzsche develops in 
his criticisms of the Judaism and Christianity. ―Slave morality‖ refers to the values of an 
underclass which accepts and prolongs its status because it cannot overcome the 
―masters‖ or aristocracy of the area the group lives in. The ancient Hebrew people were, 
as Nietzsche sees from the Old Testament (Exodus being the prime example), often in 
conditions of slavery and oppression, and so are examples of such an underclass. 
Through their history, the Jewish people created and sustained a system of values which 
said that the most important things were not victory, wealth, or power, which those who 
oppressed them had, but something different. This ―something different‖ was composed 
of virtues such as humility, faith, love, and patience, which Nietzsche points out, are 
valuable skills to have as slaves. By inventing rituals and a god who praises and rewards 
these attributes, the Jewish people secretly outmaneuver those above them in society‘s 
hierarchy, Nietzsche contends, in that they begin to believe that they have something the 
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powerful and strong do not have.35 
  But beneath the reassuring illusion of a god who cares for the oppressed, and 
says it is good and right to stay in a state of poverty, Nietzsche sees something else, 
which he calls by the names, ―the spirit of revenge‖ or ―ressentiment.‖ This spirit, 
internalized in the Jewish people after years of oppression, which rages against being 
oppressed, leads to fantasies of a final judgment when those who are slaves will finally 
be shown to be the victors. The faith of the Jews is thus a way to compensate and deal 
with the life of the tribe, one based in an intellectual approach, as opposed to one of 
brute strength and violence. Nietzsche sees it as a brilliant invention, but also as the sign 
of a decline, which worsens with the development of Christianity. 
 When Christianity is invented by Paul of Tarsus,36 claims Nietzsche, he creates 
another layer of Jewish religion, one that attempts to universalize the slave morality. 
After years of struggle the religion of the oppressed spreads out beyond its original 
context, and eventually becomes the religion of the Roman Empire. For Nietzsche this is 
an absurd and amazing event -- the masters of Europe, and beyond, living and paying 
homage to a god of slaves! Soon, the internalized spirit of revenge spreads throughout 
society -- one is thought good insofar as one ―loves one‘s neighbour,‖ which really 
amounts to keeping distaste and jealousy quiet. God promises good Christians blessings 
in another world, a world far greater than anything on earth. So everyone strives to obey 
and honour the clerics and government, letting themselves be defeated. A sort of defeat, 
or at least an aversion to glory and victory in the old Greek sense, becomes a sacred 
duty. One wishes for revenge against others but cannot act on it, does nothing to help 
oneself, and hopes for a future life of happiness, along with the damnation of enemies. 
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From a Girardian point of view, one could say this account portrays a mimetic crisis 
perpetually waiting to happen. 
  
The Religions of True Fraternity 
 
  Unlike Nietzsche, Girard sees the story of Christianity (and Judaism by 
extension) not as a victory of the weak over the strong through subterfuge, but of the 
gradual revelation of humanity‘s dependence on scapegoats, along with the vision of an 
alternative world where all people are allowed to grow and flourish, rather than just one 
type of person. The problems of European history, including the modern issue of 
widespread dissatisfaction and resentment, are regarded by Girard as residual effects of 
a weakened scapegoating still present within Christianity, rather than problems within 
essential Christian doctrine. Girard criticizes Nietzsche‘s misunderstanding of 
Christianity, explaining:  
Ressentiment is the interiorization of weakened vengeance. Nietzsche suffers so 
much from it that he mistakes it for the original and primary form of vengeance. 
He sees ressentiment not merely as the child of Christianity which it certainly is 
but also as its father which it certainly is not. Ressentiment flourishes in a world 
where real vengeance (Dionysus) has been weakened. The Bible and the 
Gospels have diminished the violence of vengeance and turned it to ressentiment 
not because they originate in the latter but because their real target is vengeance 
in all its forms, and they have only succeeded in wounding vengeance, not 
eliminating it. The gospels are indirectly responsible; we alone are directly 
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responsible. Ressentiment is the manner in which the spirit of vengeance 
survives the impact of Christianity and turns the gospels to its own use.37 
   Girard‘s ideal religion is a non-sacrificial Christianity, one which he admits has 
seldom, if ever, been embodied by the Christian church in history, which, over and over 
again, adopts the old ways of scapegoating. Richard Kearney sums up Girard‘s view of 
both the folly of the old sacrificial system and the dream of the Christian community, 
stating: 
A genuinely peaceful community would be one which, Girard contends, exposes 
the strategies of sacrificial alienation in its own functioning and enters the light of 
‗true fraternity‘-- a society which lives without the need for scapegoats.  
Girard sees the ideal Christian church as a community that does not expel but heals and 
appreciates. Historical Christian groups fail to attain this ideal, most notably in their 
treatment of Jewish people, who serve as the constant rival and scapegoat of Christian 
civilization. Kearney describes the source of this community‘s unique character: 
Such a community would free itself from mimetic rivalries, based on conflicts of 
desire and condemnations of ‗aliens‘, committing itself instead to principles of 
‗transcendence‘ beyond time and history. In short, peace requires nothing less 
than the decoupling of the alien and the other, acknowledging that the genuine 
‗other‘ is radically Other – an asymmetrical, vertical alterity irreducible to the 
envious ploys of mimetic desire. Girard […] calls this ethical alterity -- even if it 
addresses us through the face of the human other -- God.38 
                                                          
37
 Girard, ―Dionysus versus the Crucified,‖ 825. 
38
 Richard Kearney, ―Aliens and others: Between Girard and Derrida‖, in Journal for Cultural 
Research 3:3 (1999): 253. 
26 
Following this description, and contra Nietzsche, the ―transcendence‖ of Girard‘s 
Christian communities is not oriented towards a merely otherworldly heaven (though this 
is not altogether discounted). Instead, the orientation is towards a God who is ―radically 
Other,‖ who inspires a goal of transcendent love. Though the community may struggle to 
follow this God, in doing so it moves beyond labeling humans as alien, and seeks to 
recognize that humans are kin. Cultural differences are seen as minor and unable to 
bestow any truly superior power or worth to any one person or object.  
That such a community requires great struggle to accomplish and to maintain is 
the problem Christianity has always dealt with, from the writings of St. Paul to St. 
Augustine‘s City of God and onward to today. The struggle to produce ―true fraternity‖ in 
the church often leads to a hybrid of the old way, dedicated to earthly power and glory, 
along with the strange new way of the Gospel. The old model of kingship implies that the 
king creates general order by playing his role as well as giving his subjects specific 
commands. Yet the ―king of kings,‖ Christ, is the ―servant of servants.‖ From a 
Nietzschean point of view, Christ is a god who presents a strange ―will to power‖ for the 
people. Caught between the old and the new ideal, a toxic hypocrisy takes hold which 
demands that one live life for power and natural goods yet secretly, ―truly,‖ wish to exit 
the world, to be in ―the kingdom of God,‖ after death.    
In his introduction to James G. Williams‘ The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred, 
Girard makes the claim that Nietzsche is ―too obsessed with the caricature of [the Jewish 
and Christian scriptures] to acknowledge the existence of the original.‖39 Girard argues 
that Nietzsche sees clearly the same truth about Christianity that Girard does, but that 
Nietzsche perversely rejects it in favour of a god of violence, Dionysus. I contend that 
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Nietzsche did think he knew ―the original‖ Christianity, that it deemed wishing to escape 
the best choice,40 and that it got its wish in the ―death of God‖ which came to modern 
Europe.41 Nietzsche‘s wish to escape the dull, stultifying, collapsing Christianity of his 
time leads him to long for a return to the worship of the Greek god Dionysus: 
I know no higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of the Dionysian festivals. 
Here the most profound instinct of life, that directed toward the future of life, the 
eternity of life, is experienced religiously — and the way to life, procreation, as 
the holy way. It was Christianity, with its heartfelt resentment against life that first 
made something unclean of sexuality: it threw filth on the origin, on the essential 
fact of our life.42 
  The ―essential fact of our life,‖ sexuality, is connected by Nietzsche with eros 
(desire), and so with Nietzsche‘s conception of the will to power, the endless play of 
desire, creation, and destruction. Without an acknowledgement of this desire, clearly 
mimetic in nature, and a willingness to engage with it, one exists in a joyless world ruled 
by the ―spirit of revenge,‖ and this is just what Christendom appears to be to Nietzsche.  
Nietzsche knows that a full return to the festivals and rituals of the past is impossible, 
that Christianity marks a definitive break with the ancient world, that new festivals will 
have to be invented43 -- so he dedicates his life to his project and finds a new version of 
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Dionysus, a god who he sees as bringing hope to modern men, though admittedly only 
an elite few. In Nietzsche‘s view, we must escape the effects of nearly two thousand 
years of Christian rule which have culminated in the ―death of God,‖ along with an end to 
firm foundations for life.  
  Girard makes a similar assessment, and agrees that our problems are rooted in 
the instability, the perpetual mimetic crisis, that Christianity has unleashed -- but he 
asserts that there is no other way to deal with this than to continue to defend victims and 
shun the archaic order: 
 Henceforth we can no longer pretend not to know that the social order is built 
upon the blood of innocent victims. Christianity deprives us of the mechanism 
that formed the basis of the archaic social and religious order, ushering in a new 
phase in the history of mankind that we may legitimately call ‗modern.‘ All the 
conquests of modernity begin there, as far as I am concerned, from that 
acquisition of awareness within Christianity.44 
 Girard‘s particular view, that the kernel of Christianity is its regard for victims, differs 
from Nietzsche‘s view that Christianity seeks to demean victors, only by a few degrees. 
This difference is something that should be taken seriously by Girard when considering 
how to deal with desire in the world. Nietzsche‘s implicit portrayal of victors and masters 
as themselves victims of Christian thought shows an unconscious use of something like 
Girard‘s theory, a mimetic desire to gain the powerful place Christians occupy. Nietzsche 
does not, and cannot, return to the old way of the sacred, but instead draws attention to 
the part of life that Christianity, in its Girardian articulation, can seek to scapegoat: the 
joy that comes with victory and mastery. Nietzsche‘s account of religion, and of the 
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Christianity he fights against, offers Girard an articulation of how mimetic theory can 
recreate the structures of the old scared if it seeks to scapegoat victory and self-
assertion. The Nietzschean ―spirit of revenge‖ can only be dealt with if all people are 
given a place and an acknowledgment of their fragility, victors included, and so new 
ideas of selfhood must be developed. To continue this line of thinking, we turn to the 






















The Modern Murder of God 
   In the modern world mimetic disasters appear more and more, as, freed from 
authority by skeptical reason, possible models multiply endlessly, generating conflicts. 
With the Christian revelation‘s weakening of the scapegoat mechanism, the modern 
person is left adrift, with nothing to put a stop to each mimetic crisis. Wars and disasters 
become greater and stronger as no amount of blame or sacrifice can contain and order 
conflicts anymore. Girard and Nietzsche each respond to this situation: Nietzsche affirms 
a constant cycle of personal destruction and recreation, or ―self-overcoming,‖ without 
reference to a transcendent center or god, and Girard advocates a new, post-modern, 
return to the imitation of Christ. For Girard, Nietzsche‘s response is not only incorrect, 
but a path to ruin. What it lacks, as Girard correctly sees, is a view of community which 
would foster such free persons without falling back into the old patterns of sacred 
violence.  Though Girard makes an effort to justify his harsh evaluation, he ends up 
using Nietzsche as a scapegoat, bearing the guilt for the failings of postmodern 
thought.45 Against this rejection, I propose that Nietzsche‘s idea of selfhood is valuable to 
Girard‘s mimetic theory, as it provides a strong example of tactics that a person might 
utilize in the struggle for a modern, joyous selfhood without the sacred.46 Rather than 
banishing Nietzsche into the desert, the Nietzschean self should be welcomed into the 
Girardian community. 
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  Girard sees this modern world, represented so accurately by those he considers 
the great novelists, as an outgrowth of Christianity. Girard‘s mimetic theory leads him to 
believe that humans will always imitate one another in what they desire:  
In the universe structured by the Gospel revelation, individual existence remains 
basically imitative even, and above all, perhaps, when one rejects with horror any 
thought of imitation. The Church Fathers held as evident a truth which later 
became obscured and which the novelist regains step by step as he passes 
through the terrible consequences of this obscuration.47 
  In his study of Dostoevsky, Resurrection from the Underground, Girard gives us 
his version of this modern crisis, the Nietzschean ―death of God.‖ Just as Nietzsche‘s 
imagined prophet Zarathustra claims that if there is a god, he cannot stand not to be a 
god,48 the jealous individuals Girard sees inhabiting Dostoevsky's novels are those who 
subconsciously feel the great weight of taking on God‘s responsibilities: 
What is this omnipotence that is inherited, with the arrival of the modern world, 
not by human beings in general nor by the sum of all individuals, but by each one 
of us in particular? What is this God who is in the process of dying? It is the 
Jehovah of the Bible, the jealous God of the Hebrews, the one who tolerates no 
rivals. The question is far from being merely historical and academic. It has to do 
actually with determining the meaning of the enterprise that demands total 
payment of each of us, modern individuals. Every form of pluralism is here 
excluded. It is the one and unique God of the Jewish-Christian tradition who gives 
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his particular stamp to Western individualism. Each mode of subjectivity must 
found and justify the being of the real in his totality and affirm I am who I am. 49 
The struggle for this affirmation is a theme taken up most famously in Enlightenment 
philosophy by Descartes, with the claim cogito ergo sum offering a new foundation in 
place of the ―I am who I am‖ spoken by God to Moses. Girard sees this, and notes the 
flaw of this response -- it ―remains abstract,‖50 and so condemns the struggling individual 
to remain, as much as she can, in the world of abstraction. The actual, agonizing 
experience of founding oneself, along with the struggle against full imitation of or full 
dependence upon others, is something missing from the abstract accounts. For Girard 
this crisis of selfhood is a consequence of Judaism‘s and Christianity‘s destruction of idol 
worship, a rejection radicalized in the Enlightenment to include even the idolatrous 
residue of the sacred in Christianity. The role models of past tradition, given places of 
honour and hints of divinity, are now treated as hollow idols: nothing but the creations of 
flawed human beings, suitable for harsh criticism and even destruction. To exist as a 
modern individual, claiming ―I am who I am,‖ no mere imitation of that flawed, human 
past will do. Nothing can be grasped as a sure model to imitate as everything must be 
doubted, except the painful, lonely, undoubtable Cartesian self. Girard goes on to claim 
that: 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky are the only ones to understand that the task is 
properly superhuman, even if it imposes itself upon all of us. The self-divinization, 
the crucifixion that it implies, constitutes immediate reality, the daily bread of all 
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the little St. Petersburg bureaucrats who pass with no transition from the 
medieval universe to contemporary nihilism.51 
  In the wake of this modern crisis of the self, Girard responds by turning not only 
to novelists but to two of Paul Ricoeur‘s infamous ―masters of suspicion,‖52 Nietzsche and 
Freud. Whereas most of his contemporaries pushed the radical critical emphasis of 
these ―masters‖ to further destabilize structures of oppression and power, and in doing 
so seemed to get further and further from any sort of Christian orthodoxy, Girard took a 
different path. His readings of Freud53 and Nietzsche, combined with his earlier work 
based in anthropology and literature, lead him back to Christianity, though in a new form, 
one which is consciously post-Enlightenment. Girard‘s technique, well-honed from his 
research, is to look for the ―scapegoat mechanism,‖ with its two marks of victims and 
gods. Once these themes are brought to light, Girard brings them into relation with his 
reading of the Gospel, which states that God is on the side of the scapegoat. 
  A prime example of this technique is Girard‘s essay on Nietzsche‘s ―Parable of 
the Mad Man,‖ the text where Nietzsche famously wrote that ―god is dead.‖ Girard‘s 
careful reading is, in comparison to the famous explications by Martin Heidegger and 
others, quite simple. Through close attention to the parable‘s text, Girard emphasizes 
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that though "Nietzsche is taken to be the great prophet of the natural death of God,‖54 the 
death is described by Nietzsche powerfully as a murder. Here Nietzsche, according to 
Girard, shows his intimate knowledge of the scapegoating process and the birth of the 
gods -- along with the recognition that the modern murder is one different from all those 
having come before. "Having written God is Dead, Nietzsche returns immediately and 
overpoweringly to his idea -- or maybe to mine, I no longer know which."55  In Nietzsche‘s 
writing we see a challenge to the Enlightenment view of God withering away peacefully, 
forgotten and discarded as He becomes less relevant. Instead, God cannot just fade 
away; Europe does not just ―wake up‖ from the dream of God. The investment in God‘s 
existence and goals is a massive weight for Europe. The new redeemer-god of 
humanity, Reason, was securely anchored by God,56 and so Reason‘s redemptive power 
is also lost with God‘s death.  As a consequence, and in line with the myths that Girard 
has surveyed, this crisis for the madman involves "the mixing of what should be 
distinguished," and the loss of order, as he asks ―Aren't we perpetually falling? 
Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Aren't we 
straying as through an infinite nothing?‖ When the madman arrives at the deed itself, his 
knowledge of the scapegoat process and its accompanying festivals seems striking: 
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the 
murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? That which was holiest and 
mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our 
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knives — who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify 
ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games will we need to 
invent? Isn't the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves 
become gods simply to seem worthy of it?57 
  The madman speaks of the momentous event but is unsure what will happen 
after it. Girard notes that in the madman‘s speech, ―[e]verything is presented in the form 
of questions, no affirmation is possible."58 These questions surrounding God‘s murder 
are what Nietzsche finds himself both proclaiming and responding to. Nietzsche‘s 
answer to the madman‘s plea is to actively affirm the world, a world that Girard sees as a 
potentially never-ending mimetic crisis, and to provide, tentatively, a model for this 
affirmation in the form of his ―Dionysian‖ prophet Zarathustra. 
   
Nietzsche’s World After God 
[The] Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this 
mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond good and evil," without goal, 
unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward 
itself-- do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, 
too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?-- This world is 
the will to power -- and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power -- 
and nothing besides! - Nietzsche59 
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   In this dramatic and abstract image Nietzsche outlines what he sees as the 
supreme problem for modern individuals -- the groundless, purposeless nature of reality -
- and his strategy for dealing with that problem.60 As was suggested above, Nietzsche‘s 
central philosophical idea is ―the will to power,‖ which Nietzsche here claims as the 
―name for this world,‖ and it is this identification and its consequences that Nietzsche 
sees as a solution. That the world is ―eternally self-destroying,‖ ―without goal,‖ and 
―beyond good and evil‖ marks it as one where to be nihilistic is to be truthful, for there is 
no final state to attain, no true measure of value. To seek wealth or pleasure or even 
peace in the world has been presented in the past as ultimate goals, safeguarded by firm 
role models, but Nietzsche believes that an honest human being can no longer see 
things this way.  
   Some see that the world is ―eternally self-destroying‖ and so they despair -- these 
are the ―passive nihilists.‖ Without an ultimate goal, they succumb to a ―decline and 
recession of the power of spirit.‖61 To put it another way, the passive nihilists cease to 
strive to become something, whether through competition with others or themselves. 
Nietzsche sees Christianity as bringing nihilism to its fullest expression in humanity 
through its commitment to truth, and the Christianity of his time as representing a full 
flowering of passive nihilism. Christianity‘s search for truth, and identification of truth with 
God, leads to a sense that truth is beyond life, in heaven, and so beyond humans. Most 
do not know that they believe life to be meaningless, but they live in such a fashion. 
  In contrast, others, a select few whom Nietzsche greatly admires (the ―free 
spirits‖ he often addresses), see clearly that life has nothing grounding it, and act 
                                                          
60
 This section is indebted to Tyler Roberts‘ interpretation of Nietzsche found in Tyler Roberts, 
Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1998. 
61
 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 22. 
37 
creatively to pursue power over themselves and their environment. This is what 
Nietzsche calls ―active nihilism,‖ which he identifies with ―increased power of spirit.‖62 
Nietzsche addresses these few active nihilists in his writing, and he names the world ―will 
to power‖ for them. He hopes that by acknowledging the desire for power as the 
paradoxical, ever-shifting foundation of life, the active nihilists can affirm life, rather than 
giving way to despair or attributing meaning to a transcendent and unattainable end. 
  The obstacle to Nietzsche‘s affirmative quest is the great complex of fears which 
drag all people back to ultimate goals and simple answers, including those gilded with 
the complex language of philosophy. Uncertainty, insecurity, and, overwhelmingly, 
suffering are what create these fears, which Nietzsche names ―the spirit of gravity.‖ To 
succumb to gravity is inevitable, as all are involved in a web of power and influence (that 
is, all are involved in mimetic desire) -- but the free spirit seeks to always recognize the 
powers that compel and sustain her, and in doing so to find a way to both affirm the 
situation and create something new. This Nietzsche refers to as ―self-overcoming,‖ 
which, looking with a Girardian lens, I claim is an effort to escape the deadlock of 














"With Nietzsche, everything is mask. [...] Nietzsche didn't believe in the unity of a self 
and didn't experience it." - Gilles Deleuze63 
 
 Nietzsche‘s thought undermines the notion of a stable self, and attempts to find 
joy in the endless insecurity humans deal with throughout their lives. Self-overcoming is 
the name Nietzsche gives to the active affirmation of this insecurity and the endless 
opportunities for new creation it affords. From the point of view of self-overcoming, 
desires lead one to recreate one‘s self over and over, rather than confining one to a 
narrow, single role in life. This stands against notions of a ―true self‖ or soul hidden 
beneath the flux of consciousness, opposing what Descartes saw as the possibility of a 
sure foothold in the cogito. Nietzsche posits the world as an endless flow of conflicting 
forces (the will to power), taking over one another and trying to gain new powers and 
possibilities. Deleuze follows this perspective when he proclaims that ―everything is 
mask‖ for Nietzsche. This means that each thing identified as ―I‖ is fabricated, 
changeable, and without a definite structure. The will to power is the ―root‖ of the self, a 
―self‖ being a particular configuration of forces, struggling to both preserve and surmount 
their current form, and to draw in other forces (whether ideas, persons, or nations). The 
self is overcome continually by creating, destroying, and experimenting with forms and 
habits, especially those most powerful habits which construct identity. This is happening 
at all times, though most are passive about this constant death and rebirth of one‘s self, 
never acknowledging how the encounter with new people and ideas affects them. As 
Girard might put it, we do not understand that our desire is mimetic, that it is not ours in 
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any final sense. Acknowledging that we are constantly destroying and remaking 
ourselves, rather than believing we have a fixed essence, is Nietzsche‘s way of affirming 
the will to power, becoming its partner rather than its victim, a friend rather than a slave. 
This embodies Dionysian ―faith‖ by admitting the ―essential fact of our life,‖ which is 
procreation, eros, or creativity in the broadest sense. Life itself confides to Nietzsche‘s 
Zarathustra, ―I am that which must always overcome itself.” 64 
 The health or usefulness of a notion of self, of a given ―mask,‖ is determined by 
the particular forces at a given time and place. In the fullness of history, the self concept 
and role of ―humanity‖ too will not be perfected or ended, but instead overcome. The self 
that replaces ―humanity‖ is, for Nietzsche, the coming Übermensch, translated variously 
as ―super-man,‖ ―over-man,‖ or ―beyond-man.‖ The Nietzschean idea of creating, as 
Deleuze writes, "is to lighten, to unburden life, to invent new possibilities of life. The 
creator is legislator – dancer."65 The Übermensch is contrasted to the ―last man,‖ a figure 
who no longer wishes to improve, as he believes he is experiencing the end point of all 
history, the aim of all human lives –- a figure who brings disaster (mimetic crisis) through 
modeling inactivity. This attitude is something Nietzsche feared was already present 
among the privileged classes of his time. 
 It is worthwhile to pause at the idea of the Übermensch and see in it the 
configuration of a positive desire, one which is not trapped in mimetic struggles, though it 
still exists with them. The Übermensch comes after humanity, as the figure who 
understands and takes on the meaning of the will to power. Nietzsche argues that there 
have been a few exemplary men who have approached the next stage, being masters of 
themselves and others (Goethe being his favourite), but he does not locate the 
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Übermensch anywhere in human history. The Übermensch is a creator -- of new values, 
new selves, new friends, new enemies, and most of all, new joy. Nietzsche imagined that 
the Übermensch would not struggle with or avoid self-overcoming, as his contemporaries 
seemed to, but will take it on as a joyful dance. 
 An extension of the Nietzschean ideas about both religion and selves that I have 
been examining is the key idea that forms of life create forms of thought, whatever they 
may be named. Nietzsche claims that “Every philosophy is the philosophy of some stage 
of life,‖ 66 and it could be said further that each god also belongs to a stage of life. There 
is no grand cosmic plan to figure out, and so no absolute model, but instead many wills 
which seek to justify and affirm themselves and expand their powers. So the thinking, 
feeling creature calling itself ―human‖ looks to find ways to continue thinking and feeling, 
and to honour those above other possibilities. And, among humans, different humans 
develop philosophies (and religions) which help to affirm and expand their particular form 
of life. So warriors find a way of war, fisherman a way of fishing, and so on, each with 
their own models to imitate. Due to this there is no ―right way,‖ despite the protests of 
many systems of imitation and order, but only multiple expressions of a ―will to power‖ 
which characterizes all living things. So a way of life or a philosophy privileges and 
sustains a certain system of mimetic desire. When this is brought to bear upon the 
Christianity of Nietzsche‘s time, it can be seen why he eschews the Enlightenment ideal 
of a ―rational‖ critique, instead moving to a frowned upon mode of argumentation, ad 
hominem: he attacks persons rather than arguments. He asks ―what sort of person 
worships this sort of God?‖ and finds his answers that way, rather than asking other 
questions about God‘s possibility or necessity. For Nietzsche, the figure which expresses 
the God‘s powerlessness is a negatively configured Christian believer, understood by 
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Nietzsche as an anti-Übermensch, a person who lives a life based around an 
unattainable central aim, the afterlife -- which seems to him to deny that life has any 
value here and now, and preclude any notions of creatively reconfiguring life. Though 
Nietzsche would not see it, this figure has, in the language of mimetic theory, 
misunderstood a defense of victims (the defenseless, weak, and defeated) as a 
command to remain static, wishing for a share of being without movement. 
 For Nietzsche, Christianity is a tool of control and denial which contains a secret 
will to power. Yet its existence, and its affirmation of the importance of a commitment to 
truthfulness and discipline are essential tools that lead Nietzsche to his conceptualization 
of the ―will to power.‖ Arguably, Christianity is Nietzsche‘s greatest ally in his growth and 
also his greatest enemy in his quest for self overcoming. Yet the vitriol that grows and 
grows towards Christianity over the course of his career leaves out one peculiar target -- 
the figure of Jesus. Nietzsche imagines Jesus as a worthy opponent and figure, and 
attributes to him a doctrine of liberation like Nietzsche‘s own, beyond morals and guilt: 
―Jesus said to his Jews: ‗The law was for servants;--love God as I love him, as his Son! 
What have we Sons of God to do with morals!‘‖67 It is in The Antichrist that Jesus is given 
full attention for the first time, alongside with Paul, who Nietzsche claims is truly to blame 
for the monstrous Christianity that Nietzsche opposes. In The Antichrist, Jesus is 
presented not quite as a hero, but one who is blameless for what others did with his 
example, and who was a spirit too free for his time (and so someone Nietzsche admires). 
Nietzsche not only sees Christians as not living up to Christ‘s example, but goes a step 
further, proclaiming with typical hyperbole that ―There was only one Christian, and he 
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died on the cross.‖68 Nietzsche spares Jesus as an exemplary individual, one who did not 
truly found a religion, but told of a new way of life which broke with what had come 
before. As somebody who self-overcomes, and affects his society profoundly, Jesus is 
spared what so much of Christianity is subjected to by Nietzsche. This admiration 
overflows in his final days, when Nietzsche‘s sense of identity ends up slipping fluidly 
between that of his beloved Dionysus and The Crucified (Jesus) who is configured by 
Nietzsche as that god‘s structural cousin.69 Nietzsche‘s treatment of Jesus is notable for 
several reasons. It serves as a reminder that Nietzsche's contempt for Christianity is 
mixed with deep respect. It shows that Nietzsche is not an advocate for one single way 
of life, but for a single type of person, the ―free spirit‖ who finds his own way, and so 
affirms a plurality of models. Most importantly, Nietzsche‘s treatment of Jesus 
demonstrates that his configuration of Christianity is different from the one Girard 
attributes to him, in that Nietzsche does intuit another, ―healthy‖ version of it.  
 In his quest to create new forms of life after the death of the Christian God, 
Nietzsche finds a new ―faith‖ in a god he called Dionysus, who commands humankind to 
create and say ―yes‖ to life, by embracing even destruction, and self-destruction (in the 
form of self-overcoming), a god who is prefigured by a Jesus imagined by Nietzsche as 
seeking no followers. This vision of human life, and of divinity, is a criticism of most forms 
of religion which emphasize the eternal stability of the law, the order given by the gods.  
Yet it is one which, surprisingly, has strong resemblance with Girard‘s own positive 
account of a liberating Christianity, which stands in contrast to other religions. In the next 
chapter, this resemblance will be brought into sharper focus, as Nietzschean self-
overcoming is given a place in Girard‘s theory of sacrifice. 
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Chapter 3 
Better to Burn Out: Nietzsche’s Self-Sacrifice 
 
What is the New Testament? A handbook for those who are to be sacrificed. -
Kierkegaard70 
 
[T]he happiness of the spirit is this: to be anointed and through tears to be consecrated 
as a sacrificial animal. Did you know that? -Zarathustra71 
 
The Gospel reveals "things hidden since the foundation of the world" and through the 
intermediary of Nietzsche this revelation begins to become self-aware. -Girard72 
 
 In order to give Nietzsche‘s work a fuller place as an ally to Girard‘s mimetic 
theory, an examination of Nietzsche using a more rigorous version of that same theory is 
necessary. In conjunction with the work of Tyler Roberts on Nietzsche‘s asceticism and 
accounts of Zarathustra‘s ―gift giving virtue‖, this chapter begins that examination. The 
emphasis of this analysis will be on the dual insight that Girard claims Nietzsche shares 
with him most strongly -- the importance of sacrificial victims (scapegoats) for religion, 
and Christianity‘s rejection of sacrificial victims. In Girard‘s view, Nietzsche is brilliant to 
see this but is also reprehensible for choosing to go back to a culture of victims. I 
propose, however, that this reading is lacking in proper Girardian insight, and 
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Nietzsche‘s understanding of sacrifice can be a helpful supplement to Girard‘s, as 
Nietzsche sees that in the time after the death of the god (or, for Girard, the weakening 
of the sacred due to Christianity), a process unfolds where each human being becomes 
a new sort of sacrifice. It is this process that Nietzsche names ―self overcoming‖ 
throughout his work, which I show here.  
 
Each God is a Consuming Fire 
  Before turning to Nietzsche, Girard‘s viewpoint must be reviewed once more, this 
time focusing on the image of fire in relation to sacrifice. To begin, I examine two images 
drawn from Girard‘s work on sacrifice in The Scapegoat. Girard is speaking of the Aztec 
sun god Teotihuacan and his role as destroyer of plagues. The god, in the role of a 
sacrifice, is killed in order to end the plague. Girard explains the consequence of this act: 
If then the epidemic recedes, the victim becomes divine in that he is burned and 
becomes one with the fire that instead of destroying him mysteriously transforms 
him into a force for good. The victim is thus transformed into that inextinguishable 
flame which shines on humanity. Where can this flame be found thereafter? The 
answer is immediately apparent. It can only be found in the sun, or maybe in the 
moon and the stars.73 
       This image of fire, and of the sun and stars, is one which appears in many different 
myths, which Girard appeals to later in the chapter as well. The role of the fire in religious 
ritual, especially sacrifice, is too vast to review here, as is the role of the sun and stars as 
the abode (or identity) of the gods. What is important to highlight in this paragraph is 
Girard‘s understanding of the fire as both transformative, by shifting a being from a lower 
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status to one of divinity and goodness in the eyes of the community, and centering, by 
stabilizing and giving the community a symbol of unity. 
 Girard notes similar imagery when he analyzes Peter‘s betrayal of Jesus as 
recounted in the Gospels. Peter warms himself by a fire among other men and women, 
having followed at a distance after Jesus‘ arrest. Peter falls into a mimetic pattern, simply 
wanting to be one of the group. But his association with Jesus is known to one woman in 
the group, and she lets the others know it. It is then that Peter denies Jesus, for he 
realizes that his association with Jesus puts him outside the group. As much as Peter 
wishes to remain loyal, he is drawn to conform to the group, for, as Girard puts it, Peter 
―cannot warm himself without wanting obscurely the being that is shining there, in this 
fire, and the being that is indicated silently by all the eyes staring at him, by all the hands 
stretched toward the fire.‖74 Girard explains that beyond the practical reasons of heat and 
light, the fire creates a community. The woman who addresses Peter acts to exclude him 
from the community. By noting that he was with Jesus she implies that he does not 
belong with them. Peter, being alone and confused after the loss of Jesus, or ―the 
collapse of his universe,‖75 is eager to join a new group.  ―Hands and faces are turned 
toward the fire and in turn are lit by it; it is like a god‘s benevolent response to a prayer 
addressed to him. Because everyone is facing the fire, they cannot avoid seeing each 
other; they can exchange looks and words; a place for communion and communication is 
established.‖76 
 As the scene unfolds, Peter denies his former master in order to gain safety and 
community around the fire. Girard goes as far as to state that ―Peter makes Jesus his 
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victim...‖77 But the others know by his accent that Peter is not from Jerusalem, and that 
he came there following Jesus. They reject him in order to maintain the order 
strengthened and founded by the scapegoat mechanism. They tell each other, ―We are 
all of the same clan, we form one and the same group inasmuch as we have the same 
scapegoat.‖78 
  To return to Teotihuacan, let us consider the similarity between the fire and the 
god. The fire plays the role of illuminating and defining the boundaries of the community, 
and the great fire of the sun does this to an even greater degree, doing the same for the 
world. When the role of a sacrificed god like Teotihuacan is compared to a star or sun, 
the exaggeration shows how important the role is -- this god‘s sacrifice (that which 
makes sacred) has given order, and so a secure life, to the community, even to the 
world.  
  The sacrificed god, despite the myths that surround him, is for Girard definitely a 
victim, one who was rejected violently. When Peter seeks to join the community by 
rejecting Jesus, he wants to defer this role of scapegoat. Not only does Peter wish to 
avoid pain, insecurity, and possible death, but, as Girard astutely notes, shame. ―Peter is 
ashamed of this Jesus whom all the world despises, ashamed of the model he chose, 
and therefore ashamed of himself.‖79 
  People often seek to avoid being rejected by their community in some way, and 
so betray certain commitments they have made. At the level of the grand, divine sacrifice 
of a Teotihuacan, those like Peter imagine that the god must have had some special 
power to be able to give his own life for the good of the community, something Peter 
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cannot imagine having. For Girard this special power, this true being, is what we seek 
when we imitate others. The myths of those like Teotihuacan are a lie in that the victim 
did not choose to give himself for the cure of a plague, but instead was killed to found a 
new community (or to renew one). The Gospel account of Jesus is, in contrast to this, a 
―true myth‖ in that it takes the same tale and reveals that the victim-god, the scapegoat, 
is innocent of any collective guilt, and did not want to become sacrifice for the 
community. Jesus is the only scapegoat to show this truth to his followers -- the sacrifice 
to end sacrifices. In doing so he founds a community of rejects, of wanderers whose 
center is elsewhere and invisible. 
  But with such sacrifices ended, or at least encouraged to end, after this 
revelation, how is a community to be built? How is it to renew itself? For Girard this 
question remains unanswered in any concrete manner, and the great proliferation of 
answers put forward in the period after Christianity‘s ascent, and especially in the 
modern period, are a consequence of this revelation. The old ways fail not because they 
have no strength, but because: 
Henceforth we can no longer pretend not to know that the social order is built 
upon the blood of innocent victims. Christianity deprives us of the mechanism 
that formed the basis of the archaic social and religious order, ushering in a new 
phase in the history of mankind that we may legitimately call ―modern.‖ All the 
conquests of modernity begin there, as far as I am concerned, from that 
acquisition of awareness within Christianity.80 
  So the Gospels slowly remove the community‘s ability to build new ―fires‖ from 
victims by removing the ability to believe in the absolute power of those fires, and we 
return again to the loss of a stable self, both for the community and for persons. When 
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Girard discusses Nietzsche‘s approach to such victimage, he notices, with some 
(perhaps smirking) contempt that, ―[n]ot without coquetry he protests against his future 
canonization, but he prepares the way for it by setting out to become a living scandal. He 
behaves like a proper sacrificial beast."81 Girard is quite correct here. Nietzsche does 
indeed behave like a sacrifice, one who knows he is a sacrifice and one who will be 
―canonized,‖ in other words, added to a list of those to imitate, a fire worthy of a 
community‘s respect and devotion.  
 
Giving Birth to a Dancing Star 
 
One must still have chaos within oneself, to give birth to a dancing star! - Zarathustra82 
 
Indeed, we philosophers" and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news that "the old god 
is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, 
premonitions, expectations. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it 
should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face 
any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, 
lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." - Nietzsche83 
 
  Both in the voice of Zarathustra and under his own name, Nietzsche speaks of 
the joyous and terrifying freedom created in the wake of God‘s death. With the idea of 
both god and sacrifice as a fire still in mind, consider that Nietzsche‘s admonitions to 
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overcome humanity, as well as one‘s self, are in a sense a call to self-sacrifice. The 
great ―open sea‖ of the world cries out for each person to act as a sacrifice, a making-
sacred of human life, a fire to build around and to create new values. Where typically 
―self sacrifice‖ is understood as oriented towards some definite future goal or the 
preservation of the status quo, this self-overcoming wishes to continually find new joy 
along with new suffering. To Nietzsche each person should burn, voluntarily, rather than 
deferring the role of scapegoat to another individual. 
 As Girard often emphasizes,84 Nietzsche does not use religious, and specifically 
Christian, terms and tropes by accident. Nietzsche‘s world is saturated by Christianity, 
and so the themes he uses are direct from the mythological playbook, including, as Tyler 
Roberts puts it ―the discovery of a deep-seated sickness unto death; scales falling from 
eyes; brave and bleak periods of isolation; daily martyrdoms; the bite of hard-
heartedness, of discipline and desire; the flaming spirit; and, finally, the grace of renewal 
where one finds one's life and one's world transformed.‖85 It is of course the ―flaming 
spirit‖ that is most interesting here, and especially its link to Christianity: "Like the desert 
ascetics of early Christianity, Nietzsche seeks the transfiguration of the body into flaming 
spirit."86 
 The sacrificial Christianity that Girard describes is the historical struggle wherein 
the old way of a sacred center, with which both desire and violence can be channeled, is 
slowly overtaken by the realization that the old way and its accompanying role models 
are contingent, that there is ―no Greek or Jew‖ in Christ, which leads to a great freedom. 
But to live out freedom, one must still, even after this realization, choose and build order 
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-- and so, as Girard shows us, one must sacrifice. If the revelation of Christianity begins 
to become self-aware in Nietzsche, as Girard claims, it is found most clearly in 
Nietzsche‘s efforts to sacrifice (that is, ―make sacred‖) his self continually, rather than 
allowing an external object to be the site of violent expulsion.  
   In the process of this continual self-sacrifice, Nietzsche oscillates between a 
return to a purely competitive agon where the enemy is expelled, and one rooted in love, 
where each friend and enemy is both helped to grow and is helpful to growth. Roberts 
emphasizes the latter when he states: "Love, as Nietzsche understands it, is a rejoicing 
in the other, a directionality toward or desire for the other manifested in creative giving."87 
Girard is right to warn against the Nietzsche who wants to paradoxically reinstate the old 
order of rank and death, aided by reading in Darwinian ideas popular at the time. Yet he 
ought to apply his own theory of Christianity‘s dialogue with the violent sacred to 
Nietzsche, which would clarify Nietzsche‘s role for his thought. The struggle between a 
―bad‖ mimetic desire of the closed system and the ―good‖ mimetic desire of Girard‘s non-
sacrificial Christianity is embodied explosively in Nietzsche‘s life and writing. 
  At one level, Girard knows Nietzsche rejects a caricature of Christianity, not the 
"real thing." At the same time, Girard's most consistent statements attribute to Nietzsche 
a knowing rejection of the Judeo-Christian revelation in favour of violence. This rejection 
is present, yet it is not as informed as Girard suggests, as Nietzsche‘s disdain for victims 
comes from a vision of pity and victims rooted in a sacrificial Christianity, as Girard would 
put it. From Nietzsche‘s viewpoint, victims are praised for remaining victims, for waiting 
in devotion to a "sickly" reproduction of a Girardian "archaic religion," one which 
continues using the logic of the scapegoat, but does not allow for any movement or 
resolution to conflicts, as scapegoating is now shameful. Such a Christianity, which 
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punishes the strong and aggressive while telling the poor and weak to remain in that 
state, is rightfully condemned. 
  Had Nietzsche been able to conceive of a Christianity which includes Jesus' 
"good news" and a Jesus whose message included a community rather than only 
individuals ("idiots," like Nietzsche's childlike Christ),88 he might have arrived at views 
closer to Girard's. An emphasis on incarnation (the body) and divinity (as a creative joy), 
something more akin to a theosis, would match Nietzsche's longings. Roberts makes this 
point eloquently, sketching the sort of theology that approaches Nietzsche's Dionysus: 
 ...a theology of the Cross can affirm a God who suffers with humanity, who is 
immersed, out of love, in the world-reality of the human. This God is closer to the 
repeated suffering and dying of Nietzsche's Dionysus than the impassible God 
who supports the dualism of the ascetic ideal. Contrary to Nietzsche's assertion, 
such a mystical theology would find in the imitation of Christ on the Cross not a 
means to another life, but an expression of love for this life -- a life in which the 
deepest suffering is intimately connected with the deepest affirmation.89 
The dualism that Roberts refers to here maps onto Nietzsche‘s rejection of an 
otherworldly source of meaning and redemption for life. The incarnate god seeks not to 
condemn or give up on life, as Nietzsche fears, but instead to inspire recognition of the 
continual self-sacrifice each person must undergo in affirming life, which is both death 
and resurrection. To follow Christ becomes, in Nietzschean terms, a process of 
continual, affirmative self-overcoming.  
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  Further, Roberts identifies his analysis of Nietzsche with a "metaphoric 
postmodernity" which can easily be allied with Girard's work: "Whereas analytic 
postmodernity relegates all significations to the ultimately meaningless play of signifiers, 
metaphoric postmodernity reconnects the signifier to the signified through the body: 
signification is not purely linguistic; it is somatic, it speaks desire."90 The emphasis on 
"the body" which "speaks desire," beyond the purely linguistic, is just what a Girardian 
account seeks to recover in its emphasis on "the truth of the victim.‖ Missing from this 
insight, exemplified by the death of Jesus on the cross, is what could be called the "truth 
of the resurrected" -- that is, the truth of those who have overcome being a victim used 
for others‘ ―salvation,‖ and instead taken on an identity as living flame. The being who 
has followed a "holy desire" in a community she loves and desires to flourish is the 
rehabilitated victim who endures anguish and pain, never denying it in favour of some 
static "victory" or "other world." The victim‘s body, Nietzsche's body, and the body of the 
community, all speak and grow in desire, and all imitate each other in continuous, joyous 
creation by living, growing, and suffering without need of a transcendent guarantee, 
instead becoming flaming spirit.  
  Nietzsche misses this most difficult challenge of engaging with others due to his 
great nausea in the face of human laziness and contempt, and a refusal to follow a god 
of pity, along with his own deep loneliness.91 He remains caught between his contempt 
for the Christian society of his day and his love of an idealized ancient Greece, neither of 
which he can truly affirm. In seeking to affirm life in an era which seems to idolize the 
weak and passive, he moves past his own teaching, the affirmation of everything, and 
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decides to negate once more:  ―The weak and the failures shall perish: first principle of 
our love of man. And they shall even be given every possible assistance.‖92 This 
statement from Nietzsche immediately brings to mind the charges of proto-Naziism often 
brought against him.  As Tobin Siebers suggests, Nietzsche, if he is to be consistent, 
would need to affirm even Christianity93 and ―the weak and failures,‖ along with all 
aspects of life. For him to create a world where those who are intent on self-overcoming 
could flourish would involve not a new set of masters, but a new ethic of partnership, one 
that we catch a glimpse of in Nietzsche‘s own insight about religious community. In such 
a community he sees that: "Love gives the greatest feeling of power. To grasp to what 
extent not man in general but a certain species of man speaks here....this means no 
morality, obedience or activity produces that feeling of power that love produces; one 
does nothing bad from love, one does much more than one would do from obedience 
and virtue... Being helpful and useful and caring for others continually arouses the feeling 
of power."94 
  Yet Nietzsche rejected this community, despite seeming to understand it, and 
came to embody the violent and ugly aspects of sacrifice in himself rather than its unitive 
and joyous ones. Christopher Hamilton writes that Nietzsche: 
believed that to have a sense of such a fellowship was to reject the world in all its 
morally suspect manner. And he believed that to do this would be 
to reject the standing conditions of life in the only way we humans can live it, that 
is, as a life involving much that is morally reprehensible. For Nietzsche, that 
thought was disgusting, unworthy of human beings. He was trapped between a 
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sense of common fellowship with other human beings, and a desire to affirm life 
as it actually is. Unable to do either, he tyrannized over his own nature, 
exercising, but seeking thereby to exorcise, the asceticism he abhorred, and 
murdering God in the process.95  
In Hamilton‘s assessment we find another confirmation of Nietzsche‘s ascetic nature, 
cloaked though it may be in the rejection of the old God. Nietzsche acts as the sacrificer 
and sacrifice, the ―worshipper and worshipped‖ as Girard elsewhere claims, insofar as he 
does constantly overcome (sacrifice) himself, or at least struggles to do so.96 How this 
consistent self-overcoming is to be maintained while still respecting and interacting with 
others is unclear to Nietzsche -- he is trapped and alone because of his constant quest 
for a purely individual freedom and power, the only way he sees to ―affirm life as it 
actually is.‖    
 
The Lonely Sun 
  When this disgust for human fellowship comes out in Nietzsche‘s work, it stands 
in contrast to the passages where Nietzsche, or at least his creation Zarathustra, 
emphasizes the great value of friendship and gift giving. Two scholars have recently 
examined this in relation to politics, Romand Coles97 and Katrin Froese.98 Both examine 
                                                          
95
 Hamilton, ―Murder of God,‖ 179. 
96
 This loneliness and rejection of community, and their connection with Nietzsche‘s sense of 
reality, are also taken up in Giles Fraser‘s Redeeming Nietzsche, 97-99.  
97
 Romand Coles,―Liberty, Equality, Receptive Generosity: Neo-Nietzschean Reflections on the 
Ethics and Politics of a Coalition,‖ American Political Science Review 90:2 (1996), 375-387. 
98
 Katrin Froese, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between (Albany: 
SUNY), 2006. 
55 
the theme of gift and giving in Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Zarathustra can be 
seen as a sort of proto-Übermensch who acts out Nietzsche‘s ideal life (which is notably 
one still built on tragedy, comedy, and an appreciation for Christian symbolism).  
  Coles focuses on the section of Zarathustra concerning ―The Gift Giving Virtue,‖ 
which Coles notes is the ―highest virtue‖ according to Zarathustra. The attitude here is 
one who gives out of fullness, who is compassionate in a sense which is positive for 
Nietzsche, rather than the parasitic ―pity‖ which he attributes to the popular morality of 
his time. Coles also focuses on an image of fire in Nietzsche‘s work, the sun, and 
connects it to this virtue.99 The great star, which burns and freely gives to the world, is 
what Zarathustra strives to be like. In keeping with the theme of self overcoming as self 
sacrifice, the sun burns and gives. It is a star like so many other gods -- steady, brilliant, 
and without need of support. Yet it is obvious that Zarathustra does not see an end to 
strife in the gift-giving virtue, but rather a noble way of negotiating with it, as Coles notes. 
How can one become the ―dancing star‖ Zarathustra wishes to be without a dancing 
partner, without others? To give and give without receiving would leave one ―giving‖ 
without any notion of what is received, or of who is receiving. More than this, the self-
overcoming which Nietzsche assumes is necessary for life would seem to have no place. 
  In Froese‘s work this is accounted for in her reading of Nietzsche‘s concept of 
eternal return as the great interconnectedness of all things.100 This interconnection is held 
in tension with Nietzsche‘s own aristocratic politics which he builds upon the notion of will 
to power. As Nietzsche sees it, a will always seeks a stable sovereignty, or, to put it 
another way, to be a star. Froese points out that Zarathustra‘s comments on friendship 
indicate the best are those wherein ―each stimulates the other‘s development and 
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growth,‖101 rather than a self-sustaining god dictating to another mortal. The porous self 
that Nietzsche acknowledges is one which can never really become a ―sun‖ or ―star‖ -- or 
rather, it can only become such a celestial body for those who are kept far away and who 
do not examine it too closely. This is a recreation of the image of the ―lords‖ on high in 
relation to the servants and slaves who take the gifts (and commands) of the god. 
Froese‘s emphasis on the fluid nature of the Nietzschean self, along with the 
interconnection of life as an eternal return, shows the weakness of Nietzsche‘s politics, 
which lack imagination.  
  Both Coles and Froese see in the gift giving virtue the potential for another path 
in Nietzsche, one which Nietzsche himself did not follow, likely out of his stubborn 
loneliness. In this vision Zarathustra does find the companions he seeks, and more than 
this, helps create a style of life and community which encourages the generosity and 
agon which is so difficult to maintain. Julian Young, in his effort to reconstruct a proposed 
folk religion from Nietzsche‘s writing, suggests that the community which Nietzsche did 
imagine was one which gave positive role models for many different classes of people, 
held together by the pia fraus of the philosophers.102 That all people could embrace the 
radical fluidity of the self was not something Nietzsche could imagine. Yet, in reading 
Nietzsche with Girard‘s account of Christianity, it would seem that that is the proposed, 
though extremely difficult, project the church pursues. 
  Nietzsche‘s life was tragic for many reasons, his loneliness key among them, but 
the one I have uncovered here is his failure to imagine, if not a vehicle for his longings, 
an ally and fellow traveler in a non-sacrificial Christianity. Contrary to Girard‘s 
suggestions, this was not due to poor reasoning or to Dionysian mania, but for the lack of 
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a role model, and a lack of courage. Nietzsche had to try to square the circle by imitating 
himself, ―becoming who he is.‖ The Christianity that surrounded Nietzsche did hold the 
insights that Girard points to, except unconsciously, while its outward signs and the 
majority of its members carried out the ancient duties of religion in the sacrificial style. 
That Christianity is not like other religions was clear to Nietzsche -- but that it held 
anything but a strange (and brilliant) cult of weakness, this was hidden from his 
conscious mind, sighted only briefly in his assessment of Jesus. As Christianity did not 
seem to allow for any models but the heavy weight of guilt and passive nihilism, he 
proposed to become a ―flaming spirit‖ for the sake of those with eyes to see and so 
behaved as a sacrificial victim. Yet because of his inability to affirm the potential of other 
people to also become ―dancing stars,‖ as well as his need for them as partners, he 
closes off the possibility for community, and so for the Übermensch (the ideal friend) he 
longs for. This version of Nietzsche, brought into Girard‘s project, offers these insights of 
―becoming a star,‖ which can be joined together with an idea of intersubjective 












Chapter 4: Saved from Salvation 
 
  In the work of both Nietzsche and Girard, ―religion‖ is seen as something both 
integral to all communities and as something that must be overcome if humans are to 
become free. In overcoming ―religion,‖ human beings can come to deal with the world as 
it is rather than seeking some final end to suffering and turmoil. As commentators on 
both thinkers have suggested, Nietzsche and Girard seek a way to be saved from 
salvation,103 that is, to live without the promise or hope of transcending the world of 
desire and conflict. 
  Girard‘s account of Nietzsche is almost exclusively negative, except where Girard 
sees the seeds of his own insights. As the preceding chapters have indicated, there is 
much to be gained from reading Nietzsche through Girard and Girard through Nietzsche. 
That Girard is not more charitable towards Nietzsche‘s life, and to the inspirational 
quality of Nietzsche‘s corpus (both his writing and what we know of his life), is a great 
loss to Girard‘s project.  
  In this chapter the idea of a Girardian community is examined, in the light of 
Girardian scholars, followed by a look at Rebecca Adams‘ suggestion for a ―reassessed 
Girardian point of view.‖ Finally, in light of my earlier account, Nietzsche will be given a 
place in this ―reassessed‖ view. I assert that, within a Girardian model of intersubjective, 
creative community, Nietzschean thought, and the figure of Nietzsche, can be given a 
role which avoids the darker aspects of a victimizing Nietzsche.  
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A Community of Free Spirits 
  The contrast of Girard‘s vision with Nietzsche‘s lies in Girard‘s championing of the 
orthodox Christian tradition,104 and especially the imitation of Christ, as a way to 
overcome the maladies of the modern world. Nietzsche‘s Jesus is one who, though 
beautiful, admirable, and a ―free spirit,‖ is not, and perhaps cannot, be understood by his 
community. Nietzsche‘s ―free spirits,‖ as well as his Übermensch, may come together in 
community occasionally, or spar for growth and joy, but the communities they found are 
to be ones of rank, hierarchy and selective breeding. Girard‘s Jesus, in opposition to this, 
is the founder of another community of ―free spirits‖ -- ecclesia, the church, the members 
of which are ―free‖ in the sense that they know about the scapegoat mechanism. 
  Among the many theologians, psychologists, philosophers, clergymen, and 
clergywomen who make use of Girard‘s mimetic theory in their work, some of the most 
interesting thought happens within his own Catholic faith, and it is from such sources that 
we will briefly examine this community in light of Nietzsche. In his book on Catholic 
ascetic practice and Girardian thought, Andrew Marr brings together themes of 
community and selfhood, and links a parable of Jesus with his understanding of mimetic 
theory: 
Clinging to myself is a sure way to lose myself. That is to say, trying to save one‘s 
life is a sure way to lose it. A ―true self‖ is a set of relationships, as mimetic theory 
would have it. What makes such a set of relationships constitute a true self is its 
grounding in God, from which the self reaches out to others with God‘s creative 
love. If we lose ourselves, we will find it. The true self is gift planted in us by God, 
like a mustard seed. […] And as the seed within us grows into a flourishing self, 
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many other people will expand the self by resting in our branches. The more one 
wills one‘s own true self, the more one will also will the true self of other people.105 
Nietzsche‘s harsh tone and vitriol towards ―the weak,‖ as well as the Christian God, 
would seem to preclude him from appreciating such an image. Yet Nietzsche did enjoy 
seeing the self as essentially organic,106 and his great love and respect for friendship, as 
well as his overwhelming wish to have friends as equals around him, suggests that 
Nietzsche, when he is able to see others as persons, rather than masters or slaves, 
wishes for just such a mutual striving. In Nietzsche‘s published writing, as well as his 
notebooks, the number of equals Nietzsche envisions seems to be quite limited. 
Nietzsche‘s politics are typically taken to either be non-existent (which seems doubtful)107 
or viciously aristocratic, with an aim to create the conditions necessary for great men, 
and eventually the Übermensch, sacrificing as many of ―the herd‖ as might be 
necessary. Yet what if Nietzsche had a picture of an ascetic community as originating in 
the affirmation of life he seeks, that is, willing one‘s ―true self,‖ rather than the negations 
of rank and violence? Would this not appeal to the gift-giving virtue? 
  Another suggestion of this comes from Catholic theologian James Alison who 
has, since the early 1990‘s, drawn extensively on Girard‘s insights in his writing, focusing 
on key Catholic themes such as original sin, eschatology, and Christology. His vision of 
Christianity is one which is both traditionally Catholic and ―Girardian,‖ and seeks a return 
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to the ―good news‖ as actual news centred in this world, the earth. Speaking about the 
prophet Ezekiel, Alison gives us a glimpse of what he sees all believers hoping for: 
I am beginning to sense a creative project of love which is not really beyond 
resentment at all. It is so much prior to resentment that it has to hide a vast, 
playful laugh at bringing us into being, lest we misinterpret such playfulness and 
such joy from within our resentment and shrink back, refusing to believe that all 
that tenderly suppressed mirth is not ―at‖ us but ―for‖ us.108 
Are there not echoes here of Nietzsche‘s project, to laugh and play again in the midst of 
life, without the ―spirit of revenge?‖ Nietzsche was living within a world saturated by 
Christianity. As Girard suggests throughout his later writing, people come to absorb 
some of the gospel message unconsciously. Nietzsche does not intend to worship a god 
of violence in invoking Dionysus, as Girard charges, but his own god of affirmation, a god 
he imagines from the time ―prior to resentment.‖ Nietzsche wants a god who says ―It is 
good!,‖109 the eternal ―Yes!,‖ at all times.  This affirmation involves creation, dance, and 
risk, as opposed to stasis. In the Christianity of his time he saw a ―No!‖ which was not 
constructive, but final. It was a disguised ―wisdom of Silenus‖110 -- that a human would be 
better off to have never been born. 
  Nietzsche‘s philosophy, and so his Dionysus, do end up affirming slavery, 
exploitation, and a harsh hierarchy in opposition to this ―no‖ of an inactive, absolutely 
passive Christianity. His ideal of dancing, creative men of equal rank in the world 
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requires an underclass -- he does not make the grand move to suggest that there could 
be an entire world of Yes-saying, a revolution which releases humanity from having to 
crush and enslave one another.111 The world of self-overcoming persons who do not 
need to be above others, do not need to have an order of rank, the masters, is 
paradoxically supplemented by those who do need such things, the servants or slaves. 
Nietzsche‘s ideal of masters who have great friends and enemies who spur each other to 
greater things does not need to oppose a Christianity like the one Alison promotes, 
contrary to Nietzsche‘s other views.   
  A community composed of ―equals‖ in the sense of a static equivalence is what 
Nietzsche saw modern Christianity (as well as socialism and most forms of liberal 
politics) as promoting. ―We are equal, and that is that -- there is nothing to be done in this 
world, nothing to achieve,‖ say those who are equal in this sense, echoing Nietzsche‘s 
fear of the ―last man.‖ In contrast to such an equality, those who struggle to be free of 
negative mimetic desire do not rest in a static, dead certainty, but instead recognize the 
process of self-overcoming happening in all beings. Nietzsche lazily claims that there are 
simply those who are incapable of self-overcoming (the recognition of the will to power), 
of bearing the weight of such knowledge. Elsewhere it is clear that he knows modern 
people cannot be used as the building material of such a project anymore, that the news 
of god‘s death is spreading.112 Reinvigorating the blind, reactive will to power (a negative 
mimetic desire), in the form of empires of rank, is only a temporary measure. Surely 
Nietzsche would prefer a world of equal, playful rivals and friends than one in which the 
majority of people make him sick? By taking on Nietzschean ―self-overcoming‖ as a 
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powerful vision of Girardian asceticism, Girardian thought can give a place to Nietzsche 
while Nietzschean thought can try to articulate a social ideal other than lonely, distant 
masters lying to control their slaves. 
  At the end of his essay on the Parable of the Mad Man, Girard suggests that the 
death of god ―opens up an abyss of meaninglessness closed by Zarathustra,‖113 who is a 
supporter of the old engine of pagan myth. While this is convenient for Girard, in that it 
fits into his theory at first sight, pushing the Girardian analysis further bears much 
sweeter fruit. Nietzsche's writing does oscillate between advocacy of violence, even if 
only an aesthetic violence, and a glorification of the strong, giving, almost merciful 
Übermensch, who wishes for friends and growth. If one puts the emphasis on the latter 
theme, it seems that at some level Nietzsche did absorb the (Girardian) Gospel message 
of non-violence and non-scapegoating. The Übermensch, along with Nietzsche's other 
dreams for himself, battles with life, and honours sacrifice, and in doing so grows. But he 
does not seek revenge, does not blame others. And most importantly, he knows that no 
victory, nor order, is meaningful or valuable in itself. In this way Zarathustra does not 
"support" the old engine, then, but produces a hybrid of the Girardian Gospel and a 
pagan ethic of self-cultivation. Self-overcoming does not require an order of slaves and 
masters in the old sense, and in fact the older order might impede true self-overcoming, 
as it encourages strong identification with one‘s social role, a clinging to one‘s current 
mastery. Nietzsche knows such a thing is not possible, that the times do not fit with that. 
Nietzsche feels he is alone in his insight into Christianity, and speaks from a lonely 
position -- one that leads him to downplay the importance of community, and even 
promote collective violence. Girard has an intuitive grasp of this through his theoretical 
apparatus. He says of the parable that "[t]he Madman is an image of himself which 
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Nietzsche only appears to control. Like all images of himself, it transforms irresistibly into 
an imago Christ of unusual reverence."114 This is due to Nietzsche embodying the task of 
somehow moving the world beyond false redemptions, through a model which is Christ, 
though seen through a glass darkly. For Girard and those who utilize his mimetic theory 
to cast out Nietzsche based on his failings is a mistake which cuts off valuable resources 
for thinking about selfhood without the idea of a sacred centre. 
 
From “Loving Mimesis” to Loving Nietzsche 
 
Amor fati: May that be my love from now on! I want to wage no war against the ugly. I 
do not want to accuse -- I do not even want to accuse the accusers. May looking away 
be my only form of negation! And, all in all I want at all times to be only an affirmer! - 
Nietzsche115 
 
  As suggested above, Girard can gain a more positive account of mimetic desire 
through Nietzschean self-overcoming, and Nietzsche can be moved closer to being ―only 
an affirmer‖ of life by being brought into Girardian community. Independent scholar 
Rebecca Adams has put forward a proposal for a fuller, more positive account of mimetic 
desire than the one typically put forward by Girard. She feels that her ideas are a 
consequence of the ideas present in Girard‘s theories when applied against themselves -
- an account of mimetic theory which looks for and seeks to exonerate its scapegoats (or 
in other words, to rehabilitate its victims). Her proposal provides an additional framework 
for interpreting Nietzsche as an ally for Girardian thought. Adams seeks to move past the 




 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 276. 
65 
seemingly dead end of Girard‘s portrayal of desire, which seems to suggest desire is 
always negative, leading only to conflict, and that the solution is a renunciation of desire. 
The image of a community based around such renunciation seems to have no chance 
for growth, or for culture, and seems to fall easily into Nietzsche‘s charge of life-denial, 
and this is what she seeks to avoid. 
  Adams describes her ―new paradigm of mimetic desire‖ as ―genuine love,‖ 
beyond ―a split system of representation as mere nonviolence, a set of prescriptive 
ethics, or self-renunciation.‖ This is a sort of desire which embraces all aspects of life, in 
fact loves life. It seeks ―to be only an affirmer,‖ to use Nietzsche‘s phrase. However, 
following Girard, Adams too suggests Nietzsche as a model to be avoided, saying that 
her account is ―[u]nlike Nietzsche, who tried definitively to take [love and power] apart 
and who rejected Christianity in the process.‖ Though it is true that Nietzsche rejects 
Christianity, and that he often emphasizes the violent, and even hateful qualities of his 
―will to power,‖ I do not think Nietzsche‘s views are always so different than Adams‘ here, 
especially if one pushes certain Nietzschean ideas, as Adams does with Girard, beyond 
their initial conclusions. 
  The most important connection between Adams‘ account of mimetic desire and 
the Nietzschean will to power is that both are concerned with creativity, and further, 
construe creativity as intertwined with love. Adams gives an account of ―real love‖ which 
shows its dynamic and even frightening character, explaining: ―[R]eal love is not mere 
peace or harmony, and creativity is not merely positive or pretty. Real love is the 
powerful force which liberates victims and perpetrators as well, which will not allow us to 
remain small or static, a prospect which can indeed be frightening. Real love continually 
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brings new things into being.‖116 Nietzsche‘s images of the philosopher as legislator, as 
dancer, as artist, and most importantly, of the constant quest for self-overcoming, all 
resonate with Adams‘ description. Desires fully pursued create new things, not merely a 
clinging to status, people, or objects, and a name for fully pursued desire is love. The 
imitation of another‘s desire, even another‘s love, which seeks only security (and so 
scorns risk), can never become love, can never add to love, as it is not a fully pursued 
desire. 
  In an oft-quoted aphorism, Nietzsche asserts that ―What is done out of love 
always occurs beyond good and evil,‖117 and this seems to me to be the first step in 
bringing Nietzsche and his Zarathustra towards collaboration with Adams‘ interpretation 
of Girard. Adams, following her statement against Nietzsche, claims her version of 
mimetic desire allows for ―a more adequate interpretation of true power as the will to 
intersubjective creative love of Self and Other.‖ Though Nietzsche advocates for a will to 
power rooted only in individual organisms, ―against the herd,‖ there is no necessity for 
this path to be taken, and no necessity for a group to become a ―herd,‖ mindless, will-
less, and dominated by outside forces. In his work he also admits the fractured nature of 
the ―self,‖ the multiple nature of bodies, and the many internal and external drives which 
come together to form a seemingly ―single‖ will. Therefore an embrace of the will to 
power as the identity of life could easily take the form of an ―intersubjective creative love 
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of Self and Other,‖ a self-overcoming which spreads to others, rather than the bleak 
vision Nietzsche chooses.118 
  Nietzsche‘s efforts to free himself, and his readers, from resentment and the 
―spirit of revenge‖ can be seen as efforts to escape the ―bad‖ mimetic desire which 
Girard opposes. Life is often very competitive, with the desires of different groups and 
individuals coming into conflict, but it is not this conflict that Nietzsche opposes, but a 
certain reaction to it. Rather than seeking to outdo others, or to prevent them from 
experiencing growth or joy, Nietzsche‘s model is the one who pursues one‘s own will and 
own expansion. Unfortunately Nietzsche includes in this the master who would enslave, 
the warlord who would sacrifice his minions rather than grow himself. This may be out of 
necessity, as Nietzsche sees no role model who is pure and so can avoid becoming a 
master of that sort. Nevertheless, as Girard charges, Nietzsche often advocates a return 
to the old engine of kings and lords, even as he punctures and dismantles the old 
framework which preserved such systems. 
  Yet Nietzsche claims that ―the secret of the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest 
enjoyment of existence is: live dangerously!,”119 and it seems that the link between the 
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evils of mimetic desire in Girard‘s view, and the ―reactive‖ strategies of the will to power 
(e.g. ―slave morality‖) in Nietzsche is exactly in this failure to ―live dangerously.‖ One can 
see in Girard‘s account of mimetic desire a yearning for the very ―being‖ the other person 
possesses -- a vague, powerful and static something which is, above all, security, safe 
from the world of change and pain. In Nietzsche‘s account of slave morality, especially of 
the Jewish and Christian varieties, it is another world, one which again promises security 
above all else. Nietzsche‘s positive appraisal of the Napoleons of the world, however, 
leads Nietzsche to search for security as well -- the master has his slaves, after all, who 
follow and obey, which provides a great deal of strength and security. But this security 
too is false as all the slaves are also potential ―masters,‖ capable of love ―beyond good 
and evil.‖ His advice to free spirits, ―not to cleave to any person, be it even the dearest -- 
every person is a prison and also a recess‖120 holds well for all. Nietzsche chooses to 
advocate for the ―safe‖ path in advocating for hierarchy and rank, where one can keep a 
safe distance from everyone, and so stay, in a sense, pure in one‘s goal. However if 
Nietzsche is to truly ―live dangerously,‖ and overcome himself as he is driven to, he will 
have to accelerate the process in those around him -- he will have to engage in an 
intersubjective creative love, a community, one fraught with constant rivalry with the 
potential both for growth (with others as healthy rivals and allies) and stagnation (those 
who become a ―prison‖). ―Love has been falsified as surrender (and altruism), while it is 
an appropriation or a bestowal following from a super-abundance of personality. Only the 
most complete persons can love.‖121 Without a community, Nietzsche has little 
opportunity to exercise such love. 
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  That there could be other groups or schools of thought, both in Nietzsche‘s time 
and ours, that grasp the Girardian ―intelligence of the victim,‖ without explicitly being 
Christian, is a theme Rebecca Adams discusses in ―Loving Mimesis.‖ In her conclusion 
she emphasizes the importance of looking at other religious traditions, as well as 
philosophical or non-religious traditions, for signs that a similar ―upbuilding creative 
love,‖122 to use James Alison‘s term, can be fostered. This is mentioned to emphasize 
again that the path we have wandered down suggests that Nietzsche‘s insights can point 
to such selfless love, without requiring a positive appraisal of the Gospels themselves. 
Girard‘s insights, combined with Nietzsche‘s, show Nietzsche as a powerful thinker, 
saturated by the Christianity and philosophy of his day, who struggled to work out his 
own exit from a deadlocked mimetic struggle through his notion of self-overcoming. 
Though he may have failed in this regard, his efforts give us a model for rigorous self-
criticism and a willingness to engage with mimetic desire as a creative, transformative 
force. Nietzsche saw Girard‘s mimetic struggles clearly, and sought to stay with the 
world, despite this, attempting to renounce security to avoid mimetic crisis. 
  If a community, a culture, is merely a vehicle for producing a few ―higher men‖ in 
Nietzsche‘s view, could a further step not be taken to create many such beings, free from 
resentment? If such beings can go ―beyond good and evil,‖ why can they not move 
beyond mastery and slavery?  
  Following Adams‘ suggestions for a this new understanding of mimetic desire, 
Nietzsche can be utilized within mimetic theory as the ―revered guru of guru-
renunciation,‖ as Girard jokingly puts it, a contemporary figure who models the struggles 
which arise from both knowing one needs to become something ultimately independent 
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of a model yet can only arrive there once one has forsaken (and therefore, first 
successfully imitated) one‘s models. Embracing one‘s ―will to power‖ becomes the duty 
to create new strategies, and the corresponding duty to endure suffering. That Nietzsche 
did not count many human relationships as worth enduring, as worth affirming, is his 
failing, his own refusal to live dangerously. To move his work beyond this failing, towards 
a true embrace of both desire and its partner, the gift-giving virtue,123 would give mimetic 
theory new tools to make positive, constructive claims. 
  ―No longer joy in certainty but uncertainty; no longer ‗cause and effect‘ but the 
continually creative; no longer will to preservation but to power; no longer the  
humble expression, ‗everything is merely subjective,‘ but ‗it is also our work! -- Let us be 
proud of it!"124 Where else but in a community of shared love, always trying to free itself 
of masters and slaves, can Nietzsche have hoped to live out such a vision? Where else 










                                                          
123
 The gift-giving virtue is the aspect of Nietzsche‘s ideal figure which gives freely, out of 
abundance. See chapter 3. 
124













Conclusion: A Girardian Nietzsche 
 
A great value of antiquity lies in the fact that its writings are the only ones that modern 
men still read with exactness. - Nietzsche125 
 
  This quote from a young Nietzsche, at the time living as a young professor of 
philology, points to the bond that is present between his work and that of Girard. For 
Girard as well as Nietzsche, the best way to deal with the present age is to go back and 
work through the traditions that have constructed it, and so to make something new.   
  In reading Nietzsche together with Girard with some ―exactness,‖ and so using 
them both as models, I have shown that, contrary to Girard‘s suggestion, Nietzsche‘s 
notions of ―will to power‖ and ―self overcoming‖ offer more than merely the ―ideology‖126 of 
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Girard‘s mimetic desire, but instead are precursors and powerful supplements to it. 
Girard opens important questions about Nietzsche, but does not pursue his own insights 
far enough. Nietzsche‘s suggestions for self-overcoming offer a path which is constantly 
being cleared of idols, and so from the negative, ―metaphysical‖ version of mimetic 
desire, in favour of an imitative ethic which is dynamic and creative. The ―guru of guru 
renunciation‖127 provides a model where one imitates, but is never fully identified with, a 
role, and so, ideally, is not trapped in a certain tradition, but instead is liberated from 
scapegoating, saved from the need for salvation.  
 As suggested by working through the different yet complementary analyses of 
Tyler Roberts, Tobin Siebers, Rebecca Adams, and others, instead of merely seeing the 
destructive, victim-hating Nietzsche, Girard and those dedicated to his theory ought to 
investigate the Nietzsche who seeks to ―be only an affirmer‖ of life, and in doing so aims 
to embody a creative love, always striving to be free from resentment and the need for 
scapegoats. By identifying this shared aim, and engaging with the Nietzsche who seeks 
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